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Abstract
Defense techniques detect or prevent attacks based on their ability to model the attacks. A
balance between security and usability should always be established in any kind of defense
technique. Attacks that exploit the weak points in security tools are very powerful and thus
can go undetected. One source of those weak points in security tools comes when security
is compromised for usability reasons, where if a security tool completely secures a system
against attacks the whole system will not be usable because of the large false alarms or the
very restricted policies it will create, or if the security tool decides not to secure a system
against certain attacks, those attacks will simply and easily succeed.
The key contribution of this dissertation is that it digs deeply into modern security tools
and reasons about the inherent security and usability trade-offs based on identifying the
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low-level, contributing factors to known issues. This is accomplished by implementing
full systems and then testing those systems in realistic scenarios. The thesis that this dissertation tests is that we can reason about security and usability trade-offs in fine-grained
ways by building and testing full systems. Furthermore, this dissertation provides practical solutions and suggestions to reach a good balance between security and usability.
We study two modern security tools, Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) and
Antivirus (AV) software, for their importance and wide usage.
DIFT is a powerful technique that is used in various aspects of security systems. It
works by tagging certain inputs and propagating the tags along with the inputs in the target
system. However, current DIFT systems do not track implicit information flow because
if all DIFT propagation rules are directly applied in a conservative way, the target system
will be full of tagged data (a problem called overtagging) and thus useless because the tags
tell us very little about the actual information flow of the system. So, current DIFT systems
drop some security for usability. In this dissertation, we reason about the sources of the
overtagging problem and provide practical ways to deal with it, while previous approaches
have focused on abstract descriptions of the main causes of the problem based on limited
experiments.
The second security tool we consider in this dissertation is antivirus (AV) software. AV
is a very important tool that protects systems against worms and viruses by scanning data
against a database of signatures. Despite its importance and wide usage, AV has received
little attention from the security research community. In this dissertation, we examine the
AV internals and reason about the possibility of creating timing channel attacks against AV
software. The attacker could infer information about the AV based only on the scanning
time the AV spends to scan benign inputs. The other aspect of AV this dissertation explores is the low-level AV performance impact on systems. Even though the performance
overhead of AV is a well known issue, the exact reasons behind this overhead are not
well-studied. In this dissertation, we design a methodology that utilizes Event Tracing for

viii

Windows technology (ETW), a technology that accounts for all OS events, to reason about
AV performance impact from the OS point of view. We show that the main performance
impact of the AV on a task is the longer waiting time the task spends waiting on events.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The world is now more connected than ever because of the Internet. Internet users need security as a basic connection requirement because nefarious hackers have strong incentives
to break into users’ machines for different purposes. Users use off-the-shelf or opensource security tools to secure their machines. Those security tools should achieve two
conditions: First, they should secure the target system from attacks; Second, they should
not disturb the target system’s normal functionality. In other words, the target system
should be usable1 , as it was before adding the security tool. However, the balance between these two conditions is always a challenge to achieve. For example, a system that
preserves confidentiality through very strong encryption algorithms might not be practical
to use. Security systems should always be designed towards achieving a good balance
between security and usability.
Saltzer and Schroeder [83] present eight security design and implementation principles for system protection. One of those principles is “Open design: the design should
1 Usability

in this dissertation means the ability to use the target system after deploying a security tool in a normal way. If the security tool kills the performance or shortens the lifetime of
the target system then it is not usable according to our definition. Interface design principles for
security tools to make them easy to use is out of the scope of this dissertation.

1

Chapter 1. Introduction
not be secret. The mechanisms should not depend on the ignorance of potential attackers,
but rather on the possession of specific, more easily protected, keys or passwords.” So,
security tools should always be examined by researchers or developers to look for deficiencies. This process leads to better, more secure systems. The goal of this dissertation
is to examine modern security tools aiming at improving their security and usability tradeoffs. We study two modern security tools, Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT)
and Antivirus (AV) software, for their importance and wide usage. We precisely reason
about the main factors that cause known issues in both tools by studying their internals and
experimenting with their functionalities. This is achieved by implementing full systems
and testing them in realistic scenarios.
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking is a multi-purpose and powerful technique. Its
usage includes attack detection [34, 36, 80], analyzing data lifetime in a full system [28],
malware analysis [103, 102, 18], network protocol analysis [62, 99], and dataflow tomography [69]. DIFT works by tagging data and following it throughout the system. Whenever
the tagged data is involved in an operation of interest, a measure is taken. Suh et al. [91]
divided information flow into five types of dependencies that DIFT systems must track to
be complete: copy dependencies, computation dependencies, load-address dependencies,
store-address dependencies, and control dependencies. However, current research does
not track the last three in the general case, because if those dependencies are completely
applied the whole system will be tagged (overtagging) and thus the DIFT system reveals
very little about the actual flow of information.
In this dissertation, we define a tag to be the mutual information between a source
and a destination. Thus, a tag is a quantity of mutual information and is no longer binary (0 or 1). In our scheme, we reason about fine-grained contributing reasons to the
overtagging problem. When one source of information is copied into many destinations
(for example through a loop) and then some of those destinations are combined together
later in another operation, the tags of those destinations should not added, mainly because

2
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adding them would increase the tag value even more than its original value from the original source. Since a tag represents mutual information with a taint source, if two tags have
mutual information amongst themselves then their information is not independent. Also,
in certain situations, a tag value should be decreased (or even not transferred) based on the
corresponding operation. For example, xoring a register with itself should wipe out its tag
value, because the information is completely destroyed. Another example is when a tagged
address is used to zero out a series of memory locations (like an array) then the address
tag should not be copied into the memory locations’ tags. This suggests that checking the
sources of tags and the context of operations are the main things to consider to decide how
much information is being transferred and consequently how much mutual information is
being propagated. We also claim that the complication of devices and operating systems
contributes to the problem of overtagging. In this dissertation, we propose a practical way
to deal with all of these aspects. We have applied DIFT as an intrusion detection system
in two different target systems: sensor network devices and general purpose computers.
Sensor network devices are widely used these days in different venues, including military and medical applications. Providing security for these devices is required due to the
importance of the information they deal with. Sensor devices have design constraints that
are different from those in general purpose computers. Any security mechanism for sensor devices should not degrade the performance. If the right information is delivered at
the wrong time, then that could cause a disaster. Also, security mechanisms should be
economical, in terms of consuming the device battery, because it is almost impossible to
change the battery in hostile environments. Furthermore, although patching sensor application software after deployment is technically doable [60], it is often not possible. So, it is
required to have a completely secure and usable system before deployment. In Chapter 2,
we provide the required system to secure sensor network devices against remote control
attacks. We show that DIFT, in its regular binary tag implementation, can be used to secure
sensor network devices in an efficient way because of the simplicity of the sensor devices
and operating systems.
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Chapter 3 presents a novel approach to apply all DIFT propagation rules in general
purpose computers, as an intrusion detection system, while maintaining both security and
usability. In our system, tags are mutual information between data sources and destinations. Also, we introduce the idea of tag lifetime by throttling tags based on their usage
to reduce the overtagging problem. As a motivating example to demonstrate this system,
we define an attack by the amount of control that external network entities have over what
a networked system is doing. We measure the amount of information flowing between
tainted sources and the control path of the CPU for a variety of scenarios and show that
our prototype system gives intuitive, meaningful results.
The second security tool we test, besides DIFT, is the Antivirus (AV) software. The
AV cannot detect all attacks, but is very effective against known threats and is a first line
of defense against some types of novel threats. A Windows system keeps notifying a user
if AV is not installed or is removed from the system. Although we agree that the AV
is an important security tool, it is susceptible to evasion, especially through new attacks
which the AV has no signatures for. Because there is little effort to study AV security
and usability, given how important it is, we do so in this dissertation. In Chapter 4, we
examine the AV internals looking for a possibility of timing channel attacks against the
AV based on how the AV scans data against its database of signatures, aiming to enhance
the AV security if such a possibility exists. The purpose of this attack is to see if the AV
is updated with certain signatures or not, only based on time. An attacker could use this
information to know how up-to-date a user’s AV is without triggering any alerts. Even
though the AV makes the common cases (scanning purely benign data) fast to achieve
better performance (usability), it leaks information when it deals with non-common cases;
so the attacker can infer if certain inputs mean something to the AV or not by measuring
the scanning time of carefully crafted inputs.
As a complementary study, in Chapter 5, we test the AV impact on the performance
of common tasks from the operating system point of view. In this study, we want to show
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how intrusive the AV is to those tasks. The less intrusive and the better performance the
AV, the more usable. To get accurate and meaningful results, we use the Event Tracing
for Windows technology to account for all OS events down to context switches while
running common tasks. Then by dumping the events’ information into an SQL database,
we are able to design queries to aggregate information about what happened, and by which
process or thread, over time. We show that the main performance impact of the AV on a
task is the longer waiting time the task spends waiting on events.
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Chapter 2
Secure and Usable DIFT System for
Sensor Network Devices
Sensor network devices are no less vulnerable to remote attacks, such as malicious worms,
than their general purpose computer counterparts, and are presented with unique threats
because of the hostile environments sensors are placed in. It is well known that sensor
devices place challenging constraints on any attempt to secure them against these attacks,
including small performance and power budgets, infrequent patch updates, and long service lives. However, in this dissertation we demonstrate that security can be built into
sensor devices “from the ground up.”
In this dissertation we apply dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) to sensor devices, where network data is tagged as untrusted and then these tags propagate throughout
the system. Our results demonstrate that minor hardware modifications to sensor devices
can provide sufficient security guarantees against remote control data attacks. To make
these guarantees we address all five dynamic information flow dependency types (copy,
computation, load-address, store-address, and control), whereas DIFT schemes for general purpose computers are empirically only able to address the first two. Rigorous testing
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of eight applications shows that no modifications to existing operating systems, compilers,
applications, or binaries is necessary.

2.1

Introduction

Securing sensor networks before they are deployed is critical. Today, these systems are
being deployed in military and medical applications, yet are still built on top of architectures with simple memory models using the C language, or variants of C such as nesC
[48]. Memory corruption vulnerabilities can lead to worm attacks [50] and other remote
intrusions that allow adversaries to completely take control of the network. Even Harvard
architectures, where instructions and data are kept in separate memories, are susceptible
to these kinds of attacks [46].
At the same time, compared to general purpose computers, sensor devices have design
constraints that place even more restrictions on security mechanisms designed to thwart
these attacks. In addition to constrained performance and power budgets, sensors are often placed in hostile or remote environments. Thus, while patching sensor application
software after deployment is technically feasible [60], it is often not possible. Building security into the devices “from the ground up” through a secure architecture, without requiring modifications to the application source code, compiler, operating system, or program
binaries, is imperative.
The dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) scheme that we present in this chapter
marks all data that is read from the network (typically from a radio device) as untrusted
using a tag bit, sometimes also called a taint bit (throughout this chapter we use the terms
untrusted and tainted interchangeably). Tags are propagated throughout the system by the
architecture, with no need for modification to the program binaries. No untrusted data can
be used as the target address for a control flow transfer such as a jump, call, or return. This
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makes attacks that overwrite control data, such as buffer overflows and related attacks,
impossible. Control data includes return addresses, function pointers, the bases and offsets
of linked library functions, and more. Thus the architecture we present stops any attack
that overwrites control data and hijacks control flow to take control of a network sensor,
and we discuss in Section 2.5 how non-control data attacks and attacks at higher levels of
abstraction could also be addressed with this scheme.
The key insight behind our work is that sensor network applications have very regular
and predictable patterns of memory management, when compared to general purpose systems. DIFT [91, 34, 36, 73, 32, 80] has been proposed as an attractive solution to memory
corruption vulnerabilities because, if all possible information flow dependencies are addressed, DIFT schemes can secure commodity code with very minor modifications to the
hardware. Unfortunately, memory management in general purpose systems is very complex, so that in DIFT schemes for these systems the load- and store-address dependencies,
where information can flow based on the address with which a piece of data is loaded or
stored, cannot be tainted without rendering the system unusable due to false positives [89].
By not tracking load- and store-address dependencies, current DIFT schemes are open to
attacks that use multiple levels of pointer indirection [33, 38, 78]. One study [36] even
found that existing attacks not designed to subvert DIFT can evade detection and reduce
existing DIFT schemes to the same level of security as NX (non-executable) pages, which
has been shown to not stop attacks even when combined with various other limitations on
the attacker [86, 24].
What we demonstrate in this chapter, however, is that DIFT schemes for sensor networks need not be as limited, and can provide real security guarantees. We have implemented a DIFT scheme on the MICA2 platform that is secure against all control data
attacks. Through rigorous testing of eight applications, we demonstrate that tracking load/store address dependencies does not break existing applications nor require any modifications to the application source code, program binary, compiler, or operating system.
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Then through dynamic testing and manual code inspection of these eight applications we
determine that all control dependencies in the applications are benign. Thus, whereas existing DIFT schemes have not provided satisfactory security guarantees against remote
control flow hijacking attacks on general purpose systems, our scheme demonstrates that
it is possible to do so for sensor network applications.
Specifically, our contributions are the following:
1. We present a DIFT scheme for sensor network nodes, based on the MICA2 platform, that provides satisfactory security guarantees against remote control data attacks without requiring any modifications to existing application source code, program binaries, compilers, or operating systems and only minor modifications to the
hardware.
2. We demonstrate the security and usability of this scheme by testing eight applications dynamically and through manual inspection.
3. We elaborate on Suh et al.’s classification of information flow dependency into five
types (copy, computation, load-address, store-address, and control) to more clearly
define what it means for a DIFT scheme to be secure.
4. We discuss how securing sensor nodes from remote control flow hijacking based on
control data corruption can serve as a basis for security against other remote attacks,
such as non-control data attacks [27].

2.2

Definitions

In this section we discuss how information can flow, using Suh et al.’s [91] categorization
of information flow dependencies into five types: copy dependency, computation dependency, load-address dependency, store-address dependency, and control dependency. This
section is meant to make it clear what is and is not secure with regards to how a particular
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for (Loop = 0; Loop < Size; Loop++)
ConvertedArray[Loop] = LookupTable[InputArray[Loop]];
Figure 2.1: An example of a load-address dependency.
DIFT scheme tracks these dependencies.

2.2.1

Terms

A remote control flow hijacking attack is when an attacker sends data to a remote computer
or sensor and causes the control flow of a service to be diverted to the code of the attacker.
Without user intervention, virtually all remote attacks such as worms are typically of this
form. Also note that the code of the attacker need not be machine instructions, returninto-libc [70] or more advanced attacks [86, 24] are possible. Also, control flow can be
hijacked at higher levels of abstraction, such as a perl interpreter.
Control data attacks are the most common form of remote control flow hijacking attacks, in which control data such as return addresses, function pointers, and jump targets are overwritten by the attacker so that low-level control flow is diverted. These
attacks exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows [75], double
free()s [14], format string vulnerabilities [85], and more. Non-control data attacks exploit the same kinds of memory corruption vulnerabilities to overwrite types of data other
than control data, therefore taking control of the system without directly corrupting control
data.
Entropy is a measure of uncertainty regarding the occurrence of an event.

2.2.2

Copy and computation dependencies

A copy dependency occurs when data is copied from one storage object to another, such
as register-to-register, memory-to-register, or register-to-memory. When this happens, the
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tag bit of the destination should be set to the value of the tag of the source. A computation
dependency occurs when an operation such as an arithmetic operation or bit manipulation
is performed on one or more source registers, and the result is written to a destination
register. In this case, most DIFT schemes will apply a low-water-mark policy, where the
destination is tainted as untrusted if any of the source registers are tainted. Sometimes an
exception is made for the XOR operation since XORing a register with itself is a common
way to zero out the register [91]. We did not find this to be necessary on the MICA2
platform. Most DIFT schemes for general purpose computers are able to handle copy and
computation dependencies securely without compromising on application usability.

2.2.3

Load- and store-address dependencies

Another way for information to flow in a system is through dependencies on the memory
addresses used for loads and stores. For example, consider the C code in Figure 2.1 for
converting data read over the network (InputArray) from one format into another using
a lookup table (LookupTable) and storing the result in another buffer (ConvertedArray).
Each byte of input from the network is used as the offset in an address for looking up
converted values in the lookup table. It is important to taint the value that gets loaded if
the calculated address is tainted, because an attacker could send data over the network that
would no longer be tainted after conversion but would still be data in the system that had
come from the attacker. An example of how this can lead to attacks not being detected by
DIFT schemes is the Code Red worm. Most existing DIFT schemes ignore load-address
dependencies, so the UNICODE decoding routine that caused the buffer overflow vulnerability exploited by Code Red also removes the taint mark of the network input before
overwriting the structured exception handler on the stack. Thus control flow is hijacked,
but existing DIFT schemes will not detect the attack. Minos [34, 36] tracks load-address
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dependencies for 8- and 16-bit loads and is able to stop the Code Red buffer overflow, but
does not track 32-bit load-address dependencies. No existing DIFT scheme has successfully addressed load-address dependencies in the general case.
Store-address dependencies are also important. Without tracking these dependencies,
by tainting the stored value for any store where the address is tainted, indirect attacks are
possible. In addition to the possibility that an attacker could use multiple levels of pointer
indirection to subvert a DIFT scheme [33, 38, 78, 89], testing has shown that even attacks
not designed specifically for DIFT schemes can hijack control flow undetected due to
store-address dependencies [36], such as the ASN.1 bit string heap corruption vulnerability
in Microsoft Windows [106].
No existing DIFT scheme for general purpose computers can sufficiently track information flow through load- and store-address dependencies. The reason is that, even for
normal systems that are not vulnerable and not under attack, information flow from the
network into heap and stack pointers is common. Using heuristics to determine which
address dependencies are acceptable and which constitute avenues of attack is infeasible
because of the complexity of dynamic memory allocation in general purpose applications.
Fortunately, our results show that, due to the relatively simple and regular memory management of sensor devices, all load- and store-address dependencies can be tracked in sensor network applications. No modifications to the application, program binary, compiler,
or operating system are required. Thus, the only dependency that remains to be addressed
in our scheme is control dependencies.

2.2.4

Control dependencies

Because our scheme fully tracks all four of the aforementioned dependencies, the only way
for an attacker to cause information to flow from the network to control data is through
control dependencies. A control dependency occurs when the value of one piece of data
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affects the execution path of the program, which in-turn affects the value of another piece
of data. As an example, consider the following C code:
if (x == 1)
y = 1;
else
y = 0;
Clearly, information flows from x to y but there is no explicit assignment and no address dependencies between these two variables. In confidentiality settings, this is referred
to as an implicit flow. Methods exist for tracking implicit flows dynamically, including
temporarily tainting the program counter on conditional control flow transfers [44, 43]
and annotating the machine code with label transformations [95], but these methods are not
practical without modifying the compiler or performing static analysis and binary rewriting. Furthermore, DIFT is an integrity policy that differs from confidentiality settings in
that information should be allowed to flow through control dependencies if it does not
allow the attacker to corrupt control data. Network services should read data over the network and perform different actions based on the data read, so some amount of information
flow from the network to the control flow of the program is always necessary.
Where control dependencies become a security problem for DIFT is when it is possible
for the attacker to launder the taint bit, so that a value under their control is no longer
tainted. An example of this is the following:
UntaintedData = 0;
while ((TaintedData--) != 0)
UntaintedData++;
After the above code is executed, the value of TaintedData will be copied into
UntaintedData but the latter will not be tainted in the process, so that data from the
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attacker is now marked as trusted. An example of a benign control dependency that cannot
be exploited by the attacker for control data attacks is the following:

if (TaintedData == 0)
HandleRequestTypeA();
else if (TaintedData == 1)
HandleRequestTypeB();
else
HandleRequestTypeC();

In this case, a conditional control flow transfer is made based on untrusted data from
the network, but an attacker can only choose which path to take by sending a different kind
of request over the network. Thus the attacker has only as much control over the control
flow of the program as a regular client.
Another difference between confidentiality and integrity settings is that typically the
former assumes that the code being executed is chosen arbitrarily by the attacker, whereas
in most integrity settings like DIFT the source code of the trusted application being executed is assumed not to maliciously attempt to untaint data. Nonetheless, for general purpose systems it has been shown that regular code for operations such as printf()-style
format string conversion and other format conversions can lead to attacker-controlled data
becoming untainted and leading to attacks that evade DIFT schemes [36]. In Section 2.4
we demonstrate that no similar problems exist in the eight sensor network applications that
we tested. Here we define laundering as follows.
A control dependency that causes information to flow from a tainted variable x in state
s to an untainted variable y in state t is benign if and only if I(xs ; yt ) << H(xs ), i.e.,
the mutual information between the two variables after the operation is much less than the
entropy of the tainted variable. Thus an attacker cannot cause her inputs to be untainted
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without a consequent loss of entropy, which takes away her ability to arbitrarily corrupt
data. A control dependency that is not benign is said to be laundering.
Another important distinction is that of first-order control dependencies vs. higherorder dependencies1 . When tainted data is used in a conditional control flow transfer this
causes a first-order dependency in which information can flow into untainted values. If
a first-order dependency were not benign then it would be necessary to taint additional
data that could lead to additional higher-order dependencies, where conditional control
flow transfers that would not have depended on tainted data now do. If all first-order
dependencies are benign, then there is no possibility for high-entropy, laundering secondorder dependencies. Thus in Section 2.4 we need only to consider first-order dependencies,
because all of these are found to be benign.
Existing DIFT schemes [34, 91, 73, 32, 80] do not consider control dependencies.
Minos [34, 36] handles some laundering control dependencies by treating 8- and 16-bit
immediate values differently than 32-bit immediates, assuming the former to be untrusted.
This is not a principled solution, but is necessary for DIFT schemes to catch certain kinds
of attacks on general purpose computers such as format string attacks [85]. In our scheme
for sensor network devices, we have not added any special support for control dependencies because testing and manual analysis revealed that no control dependencies in the
applications we tested are laundering, i.e., they are all benign.

2.3

Implementation

In this section, we describe our emulated DIFT scheme for the MICA2 platform, and the
method we used to locate first-order control dependencies.
1 The

first-order control dependency means here the first control dependency in a (possibly)
nested control statement.
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Application
AntiTheft

Main Functionality
Detects and reports theft

BaseStation

Bridges serial and radio links

RadioSenseToLeds

Samples default sensor and broadcasts readings in an AM packet
Maintains a 4Hz counter and broadcasts its value in an AM packet when
updated
Samples the default sensor and
broadcasts a message every 10 readings
Increments a counter and sends a radio message whenever a timer fires
Tests radio active messages
Blinks the 3 mote LEDs

RadioCountToLed

Oscilloscope

BlinkToRadio
TestAM
Blink

Setup
Three nodes, a root binary and two with same
binary
Two nodes, different binaries
Two nodes, same binary

Pass
Yes

Two nodes, same binary

Yes

Two nodes, same binary

Yes

Two nodes, same binary

Yes

Two nodes, same binary
One node

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Table 2.1: Application functionalities.

be tagged as untrusted. In the MICA2 platform, the radio chip is connected to the
MCU (microcontroller) through the SPI bus. The SPI connects two or more devices
through a master/slave relationship. The SPI has a dedicated memory I/O register
in the MCU data memory for performing data exchange. By permanently tagging
this register as untrusted, all data read from the network enters the system tainted as
untrusted data.
• Taint propagation: Our taint propagation scheme correctly handles copy, computation, load-address, and store-address dependencies. Existing DIFT schemes only
consider the first two, although sometimes the latter two are handled in a limited
way. For single-operand instructions such as bit rotations (e.g., ROR) the register
simply retains its tag. For instructions with multiple operands (e.g., ADD, SUB,
AND) we taint the destination register if any source register is tainted. This is known
as a low-water-mark policy because any data that depends on tainted data is itself
tainted. Register-to-register copies of data also copy the tag. PUSH and POP propa-
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Application
AntiTheft

BaseStation

RadioSenseToLeds

RadioCountToLed

Oscilloscope

BlinkToRadio

TestAM
Blink

Control dependencies
vector 17() (root)
runTask() (root)
vector 17()
print packet()
findIdx()
routingTableFind()
updateNeighborEntryIdx()
getOption()
runTask()
vector 17()
setWakeup()
putData()
runTask()
vector 20()
vector 17()
receive()
runTask()
vector 17()
receive()
fired()
runTask()
vector 17()
receive()
runTask()
vector 17()
receive()
runTask()
setLeds()
vector 17()
runTask()
N/A

Laundering or Benign?
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
Benign
N/A

Table 2.2: Control dependencies in the applications tested.

gate the tag of the register or memory location that is pushed or popped onto or off of
the stack. Load (LD) and store (ST) operations apply the low-water-mark policy not
only to the source data that is loaded or stored, but also to the address used for the
load or store (which is always stored in the X, Y, or Z registers). Thus if the source
of a load or store is untainted but the address used is tainted, the destination will
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always be tainted so that load-address and store-address dependencies are correctly
handled. Conditional control flow transfers do not taint the program counter because
all sensor network applications that we tested had only benign control dependencies.
• Taint check: Our scheme checks the tags of target addresses (whether they are ex-

plicit operands or unstacked inputs) for all control flow transfers with target addresses that are not hardcoded as immediate values. This includes RET (subroutine
return), RETI (interrupt return), ICALL (indirect call), EICALL (extended indi-

rect call), IJMP (indirect jump), and EIJMP (extended indirect jump). If the target
address is tainted, then this indicates an attempted attack and the node is reset.

2.3.2

Locating first-order control dependencies

The AVR instruction set has conditional control flow transfers that work in a way that is
similar to those of the Pentium instruction set architecture. Some instructions, e.g., CMP
(compare) and arithmetic expressions, set various flags to indicate properties of their arguments such as equality, sign or less-than, overflow, etc. Conditional control flow transfer
instructions such as JE (jump if equal) check these flags and either jump to a hardcoded
jump target or simply move on to the next instruction depending on the value of the flag.
To locate all first-order control dependencies, we modified the emulator as follows.
When an instruction sets a flag, the tag of the flag is set using a low-water-mark policy
based on the operands of the instruction. When a conditional control flow occurs based
on a flag that is tainted, and therefore based on untrusted data, the program counter for the
location of that conditional control flow transfer is recorded. Using a variety of tools it is
possible to locate the corresponding nesC code.
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//The receiver code
10. void overflow(uint8_t *rcm)
20. {
30.
char buf[3];
40.
uint16_t *ptr[4];
50.
strcpy(buf, rcm);
60.
/* copy receive()’s stack pointer into caller()’s
stack pointer */
70.
*ptr[0] = *ptr[1];
80.
/* copy receive()’s ret address into caller()’s
ret address*/
90.
*ptr[2] = *ptr[3];
100. }
110. void caller(uint8_t *rcm)
120. {
130.
...
140.
overflow(rcm);
150.
...
160. }
170. event message_t* Receive.receive(message_t* bufptr,
void* payload, uint8_t len)
180. {
190.
uint8_t *rcm = (uint8_t*) payload;
200.
...
210.
caller(rcm);
220.
...
230. }

Figure 2.3: Receiver code containing a vulnerability with load- and store-address
dependencies.

2.4

Results

Our experimental methodology sought to answer three key questions with respect to applying DIFT to sensor network devices and applications:
1. Is it possible to track load- and store-address dependencies, in addition to the copy
and calculation dependencies tracked by conventional DIFT systems, without modifying the application, compiler, or operating system in any way? Our results demonstrate that the answer is yes.
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//The sender code
10. payload = (char *) call Packet.getPayload(&packet, NULL);
20. strcpy(payload, "\x22\x33\44\xd9\x10\xe0\x10\xd7\x10\xde\x10");
30. call AMSend.send(AM_BROADCAST_ADDR, &packet, 11);

Figure 2.4: Sender code with the attack.
2. Is it necessary to add special taint propagation rules to handle control dependencies?
Our results indicate that the answer is no, since all first-order control dependencies
in the applications we analyzed are benign.
3. Does our scheme detect the attacks that it is designed to detect, including attacks
with load- and store-address dependencies? Our results confirm that it does detect
control data attacks.

Figure 2.5: Stack trace during the attack.
To answer the first question we tested all applications that we were able to obtain that
could be executed on the ATEMU emulator. While our hardware DIFT scheme can secure
any application for any operating system on the MICA2 platform without any software
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modifications, we were only able to run TinyOS [9] applications on the ATEMU emulator due to limitations of the emulator (other OSes either are not available for the MICA2
platform or do not work with the ATEMU framework). TinyOS is by far the most commonly used operating system for sensor network applications. The eight applications that
we tested use a wide variety of TinyOS’ functionalities, as shown in Table 2.1. Table 2.1
also shows that rigorous testing of all of the applications’ functionalities yielded no false
alerts. The third column describes the network setup for the application, and the fourth
column indicates that all applications passed rigorous testing without producing any false
alerts.
We answered the second question through a combination of testing the applications
to locate the first-order control dependencies and then manual analysis of the source code
for these control dependencies to determine if they are laundering or benign. The second
column of Table 2.2 lists all first-order control dependencies in each application for the
functionalities tested. We determined this by printing an alert with the program counter
every time a conditional control flow transfer was made using a test of tainted data. As can
be seen in the third column, all first-order control dependencies in all applications were
determined to be benign through manual code inspection. This means that, for all applications tested, no special mechanism is needed to propagate tags for control dependencies
and thus no higher-order control dependencies need be considered.
The third question is more of a claim to be confirmed than a question, since tracking
all possible data dependencies will stop any attack that overwrites control data with untrusted data from the network. Whereas existing DIFT schemes measure “false positives”
and “false negatives,” our scheme for sensor network nodes makes satisfactory security
guarantees that ensure that no remote control-flow hijacking attack based on memory corruption of control data can succeed. Nonetheless, we tested various attacks against our
scheme to confirm that an alert was indeed raised in all cases. The attacks we tested include all attacks described by Francillon et al. [46] and Gu et al. [50], as well as an attack
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we developed to test the tracking of load- and store-address dependencies.
The vulnerability illustrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate how load- and storeaddress dependencies can be exploited to arbitrarily copy untainted data from one place to
another. No previous DIFT schemes can stop an attack of this kind. Basically, four pointers
on the stack are overwritten by the attack, then used as the source and destination addresses
of two copy operations. Any DIFT scheme that does not consider address dependencies
will copy data from an arbitrary source address to an arbitrary destination, both chosen
by the attacker, without tainting the result. This can lead to attacks not detected by these
DIFT schemes [33, 38, 78]. We tested our DIFT scheme with such an attack based on
the vulnerability in Figure 2.3 and an alert was raised, demonstrating that our scheme is
secure with respect to address dependencies.
Figure 2.5 (a) shows the layout of the stack on the receiver side after receiving the
message coming from the sender and then executing the following sequence of function
calls: receive() calls caller(), and then caller() calls overflow(). The
stack shows how the local variables and activation records (including return addresses and
stored stack pointers) are laid out on the stack. Figure 2.5 (b) shows the exact values
that will occupy the local variables of overflow() right after line 50 is executed. Note
that the strcpy() in line 50 has overflowed the buffer buf with more data than it has
room to store. The extra data overflows the four pointers right after the buffer buf. Figure 2.5 (c) shows the stack contents after the execution of lines 70 and 90. The stack
pointer of caller() has been changed to that of receive(), and the return address
of caller() has been changed to that of receive(), Note that the return address
has not been overwritten by strcpy(), but changed using a tainted pointer. Now when
overflow() returns it returns to receive() directly, bypassing the caller() function, and will continue functioning as normal. Existing DIFT schemes will not detect this
attack because they do not track load- and store-address dependencies. We tested this attack on our scheme and it was indeed detected. While the vulnerability in Figure 2.3 is
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a hypothetical example, vulnerabilities with load- and store-address dependencies are not
uncommon in real application code, as discussed in Section 2.2.

2.5

Discussion and Future Work

In this section, we discuss four aspects of our DIFT scheme for sensor network nodes that
could be explored further in future work.

2.5.1

Scaling up to other embedded devices

While the focus of this chapter has been on sensor network nodes, an interesting question
is what other systems can DIFT schemes that check load- and store-address dependencies
scale up to. Researchers have explored address dependencies on general purpose systems [89], finding that the complex memory management of these systems makes tracking
these dependencies infeasible. It is an open question whether a DIFT scheme that tracks
address dependencies would be practical on other embedded devices with more complex
memory management than sensor network nodes. Many false alerts could be ameliorated
by untainting tainted data under certain conditions. We leave this as the subject of future
work.

2.5.2

Non-control data attacks

It is well known that attacks can hijack control flow or otherwise take control of a machine
without overwriting control data [27]. After control data and low-level control flow is secured then this can serve as a foundation for securing other types of data. Furthermore,
it would be possible to extend our DIFT scheme to enforce various type systems by increasing the number of bits and allowing for more complex taint propagation rules. The
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Elbrus line of machines as described by Babayan [16] implemented this type of security
for C programs, where any memory corruption attack that is a type violation (virtually all
are) is prevented, but general purpose applications must be rewritten for reasons related
to memory management. Whether sensor networks can be secured against non-control
data attacks in this fashion and the impact this would have on power and performance are
questions left for future work.

2.5.3

Control dependencies and other types of information flow

Because all first-order control dependencies in the applications that we tested were benign,
we did not implement any special taint propagation rules for control dependencies. For
applications that do have laundering control dependencies it would be possible to give
developers an automated way of finding these and a secure way to taint them, perhaps by
annotating their source code.
Because we are enforcing an integrity policy, rather than confidentiality, we assume
that it is safe to ignore covert timing channels [59, 63, 100].

2.5.4

Hardware modifications and power and performance overheads

DIFT can be implemented simply by adding an extra bit to every byte in the registers,
pipeline, and memory, and some simple logic gates where operations occur [91, 34]. The
performance and power overheads are negligible. While any pipeline modification requires
adoption of a DIFT scheme by chip manufacturers, several reasons make it more likely
that sensor network applications will benefit from DIFT than general purpose computers.
These include the following:

• One reason that hardware DIFT support has not been adopted by chip manufacturers
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for general purpose computers is that for these systems DIFT provides no real security guarantees. In contrast, we demonstrate that satisfactory guarantees of security
against a major class of attacks can be achieved for sensor network applications.
• The economics of embedded devices presents less barriers to hardware support
for security, testing, reliability, etc., as evidenced by successful extensions such as
JTAG [53].
• The MCU and memory of sensor network nodes are often packaged as one device

so only one chip needs to be changed, whereas proper DIFT support for general

purpose computers would require new DRAM chips, a motherboard with extra bits
for sockets and buses, and operating system support for virtual memory swapping
with tag bits.

2.6

Related Work

We divide related work into two parts: worm attacks and defenses in sensor networks, and
security against remote memory corruption.

2.6.1

Worm attacks and defenses in sensor networks

Gu et al. [50] showed that remote control data attacks can be exploited on sensor network
nodes, and Francillon et al. [46] demonstrated that after exploiting a buffer overflow an
attacker can even reprogram instruction memory with the SPM instruction. Our DIFT
scheme for sensor network applications stops any attack that corrupts control data.
Ferguson et al. [45] propose a defense against control data attacks on sensor nodes
that is similar to Control Flow Integrity [10, 11]. This incurs significant power and performance overhead and requires modifications to the program binary. Furthermore, attacks
are not detected after control flow is hijacked until the attacker executes some code that
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transitions to another function. This is because the control flow sequence check is performed at the end of each function. Furthermore, the function marks are stored on the
stack for function calls and are therefore also subject to corruption, and because they are 8
bits in length they can also be guessed with a brute force attack. Lastly, interrupt routines
are not considered in the control flow sequence.
Kumar et al. [58] use software-based fault isolation to provide a coarse-grained form
of memory protection for sensor applications and the operating system. Yang et al. [101]
present a defense that is based on software diversity, where multiple versions of an application are created. Regehr et al. [82] implement efficient type and memory safety on a
small, 8-bit embedded device. This requires modifications to the entire compilation chain,
and even after optimization some applications can have more than a 35% increase in code
size and a 6% performance overhead. Our proposed DIFT scheme would require hardware modifications, but would work with existing compilers and binaries with no need for
binary rewriting, and have negligible power and performance overhead.

2.6.2

Security against remote memory corruption

The two research areas most relevant to our own regarding security against remote memory
corruption are DIFT schemes for general purpose machines, and control flow integrity.
DIFT was introduced by Suh et al. [91]. Crandall and Chong [34] and Crandall et
al. [36] explored various policy tradeoffs for DIFT schemes and higher-level systems
issues such as virtual memory swapping, and Vigilante [32] employed DIFT for automated worm defense. Further research focused on making DIFT more flexible either in
software [73] or through more flexible hardware extensions [39]. Argos [80] is a widelydeployed honeypot technology based on DIFT. Researchers have also analyzed the security
and applicability of DIFT [33, 38, 78, 89].
Our scheme is the first DIFT scheme for sensor network applications. As discussed
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earlier in this chapter, no existing DIFT schemes for general purpose computers address
load-address, store-address, or control dependencies in a way that supports satisfactory
security guarantees against control data attacks. Our scheme tracks all load- and storeaddress dependencies, and through testing and manual analysis we determined that all
sensor network applications that we tested had only benign control dependencies. While
flexible DIFT schemes [39, 73] could allow any policy to be enforced, nobody has actually
specified a DIFT policy that secures general purpose systems. Research suggests that this
is impractical for general purpose systems due to address dependencies [89], and even
existing attacks not intended to evade DIFT have been shown to not be detected by existing
DIFT policies [36].
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [10, 11] uses binary rewriting and checks to ensure the
validity of all control flow transfers. CFI requires no hardware modifications, and gives
strong security guarantees even in an attack model where the attacker can read or write
any location in memory. However, CFI requires significant changes to the compiler and
library linking infrastructure. Furthermore, an implementation of something similar to
CFI for sensor network nodes showed significant performance and power overheads, as
well as a large increase in code size [45]. Without further research, it is not clear if these
overheads were due to the particular implementation or are inherent to CFI.
DIFT for other things besides control data attacks...

2.7

Conclusion

We have presented a DIFT scheme for sensor network applications that is secure against
remote control data attacks because all data dependencies are either tracked or shown to
be benign. Whereas existing DIFT schemes for general purpose computers consider only
two of the five data dependency types (copy, calculation, load-address, store-address, and
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control), our scheme tracks the first four and testing and manual analysis of applications
demonstrates that the fifth is always benign (for the applications we tested, other sensor
network applications could easily be tested in a similar manner). Testing of eight applications also showed that no modifications to the compiler, operating system, application
source code, or program binaries is necessary. We expect that, whereas DIFT has not yet
led to secure general purpose systems, DIFT will lead to secure sensor network devices
with security built-in “from the ground up.”
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Chapter 3
Secure and Usable DIFT System for
Intrusion Detection
Current intrusion detection systems (IDSes) fall into two very limiting categories: appearancebased or behavior-based. IDS operators specify attacks that should be detected either by
some type of signature or statistical invariant, or by specifying a sequence of operations
(e.g., system calls) that is considered malicious. What if we could specify intrusions as
flows of information? This would enable the IDS systems of the future to very explicitly define attacks in a general way that precluded entire categories of vulnerabilities and
exploits.
The main reason why IDS systems do not currently have this ability is that dynamic
information flow tracking (DIFT) technology is extremely limited in its current form.
DIFT works by tagging (or tainting) data and tracking it to measure the information flow
throughout the system. Existing DIFT systems have limited support for address and control dependencies, and therefore cannot track information flow within a full system without
addressing these very challenging dependencies in an ad-hoc fashion.
In this chapter, we present a prototype DIFT system that supports address and control
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dependencies in a general way. As a motivating example to demonstrate this system, we
define an attack by the amount of control that external network entities have over what a
networked system is doing. We measure the amount of information flow between tainted
sources and the control path of the CPU for a variety of scenarios and show that our
prototype system gives intutive, meaningful results.

3.1

Introduction

Information flow is a fundamental concept in computer and network security. Dynamic
information flow tracking (DIFT) systems could enable a wide variety of applications, but
their applicability is currently very limited because important information flow dependencies are not tracked for stability reasons. We define stability of a DIFT system to mean that
the amount of taintedness in the system should not increase unless the amount of information in the system from a tainted source has increased. Without this property the entire
system quickly becomes tainted and nothing can be learned about the actual information
flow. We define accuracy to mean that the measured information flow should be close to
the real information flow in the system.
In aircraft design, a technique called “relaxed static stability” allows for the design of
aircraft with advanced maneuverability and stealth capabilities by relaxing the requirement
of designing the aircraft to have inherent positive stability during flight. Modern fighter jets
and stealth aircraft are designed with inherently negative stability, then advanced digital
“fly-by-wire” systems are incorporated into the design to create a stable system that can
actually fly. This has opened up possibilities for aircraft design that were thought to not
be possible before. In this chapter we apply this same general principle to the design of
DIFT systems, and demonstrate that this makes it possible to track address and control
dependencies in a stable DIFT system, something that existing DIFT techniques have not
been able to achieve with a general method. While our current DIFT system is based on an
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open-loop controller, i.e., there is no feedback from the system output back into the control
system, approaching DIFT as a control problem and decoupling the competing design
requirements of stability and accuracy enables stable, full-system dynamic information
flow tracking.
Current DIFT systems that are stable achieve this only by ignoring large classes of
information flow or treating them in an application-specific manner. Existing DIFT systems [91, 34, 73, 32, 80] are based on the general notion of tracking “taint” marks. A
taint mark, which can be a single bit, is associated with every byte or word in the memory.
Data from some particular source is “tainted” and these taint marks are propagated and
used to approximate information flow. For example, in the application of DIFT to detecting control flow hijacking attacks based on memory corruption, all bytes that come from
the network are tainted. These taint marks are propagated so that as tainted data moves
around in the registers and memory of the system and new data is calculated based on
tainted inputs, any data based on the untrusted source (typically the network) is tainted.
Then memory corruption attacks that hijack control flow can be detected by checking all
jumps, calls, and returns to ensure that their destination addresses are not based on tainted
data [91, 34, 73, 32, 80].
Systems that measure information flow and do track address and/or control dependencies are either unstable [43, 44, 95, 93] or have limited, application-specific support
for these dependencies. Panorama [103], for example, demonstrates the power of fullsystem information flow measurement, but handles address and control dependencies in
an application-specific manner (see Section 3.6 for details).
Suh et al. [91] divided information flow into five types of dependencies that DIFT
systems must track to be complete: copy dependencies, computation dependencies, loadaddress dependencies, store-address dependencies, and control dependencies. Copy dependencies are movements of the data from register to register, register to memory, or
memory to register. The obvious way to track these dependencies is to also copy the taint
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mark from source to destination. Computation dependencies are operations on the data
such as, e.g., when two registers are added and the result is stored in a destination register. Most DIFT systems are conservative and taint the result if either of the sources were
tainted.
All existing practical DIFT systems, including those intended for applications other
than detecting memory corruption attacks, either ignore or provide very limited support
for the last three types of dependencies. Address dependencies during loads or stores
would require that the destination of the load or store be tainted if the address used is
tainted. For example, consider the following C code for converting an array of tainted
input from one format to another using a lookup table:

for (Loop = 0; Loop < Size; Loop++)
Converted[Loop] = LookupTable[Input[Loop]];

In terms of real information flow, the value stored in Converted[Loop] should be
tainted if the value loaded from Input[Loop] is tainted. This will only be true for a
given DIFT system if the DIFT system checks the taintedness of the address used for the
load with LookupTable as its base and propagates this taint. DIFT systems do not do
this in the general case because it causes instability in the DIFT system where everything
in the system quickly becomes tainted. Store address dependencies are a related problem
for stores instead of loads. One of the contributions of this work is a DIFT system that
does track address dependencies in a general way.
The DIFT system we present in this work is also able to track control dependencies,
whereas previous DIFT systems have not tracked control dependencies, except in limited,
application-specific ways. Control dependencies are related to the classic problem of implicit information flows, and arise from information flows such as the following from x to
y:
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if (x == 1)
y = 1;
else
y = 0;

Address and control dependencies are practical concerns for all DIFT systems [91, 89]
and have prevented the application of DIFT outside of very restricted domains. Many
remote attacks, such as script code injection or Trojans embedded in PDF documents, require both of these dependencies to be tracked in some way in order to be detected. Thus
DIFT-based honeypots have only been deployed for detecting remote control flow hijacking attacks based on overwriting control data [34, 35, 80]. Also, consider the application
of a practical data provenance system that keeps track of fine-grained information flow
within a system, where the threat model is not an attacker who can write arbitrary code
to leak information, but rather the accidental leak of confidential information, e.g., when
a user cuts and pastes from a word processor file into a presentation and then saves the
file to external storage. If the external storage is lost, the organization would like to have a
detailed, fine-grained record of what confidential information was on it. Because of format
conversions (e.g., ASCII to UNICODE or object-oriented clipboard format conversions)
and other practical considerations there will be many address and control dependencies
that must be tracked for the DIFT system to work as intended.
As mentioned previously, current DIFT systems cannot track these dependencies in
a general manner because tainting address and control dependencies causes instability in
the DIFT system. If you simply propagate taint marks for either of these dependencies
conservatively, every object in the system quickly becomes tainted, which tells us nothing
about the information flow in the system. Outputs of interest will be tainted whether or
not there was real information flow to them. This has been identified as a major limitation
for DIFT [91, 89], and is not solved by information flow tracking systems designed for
confidentiality, such as Fenton’s Data Mark Machine [43, 44], RIFLE [95], or GLIFT [93],
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because they also “overtaint” without static analysis, which is impractical for most DIFT
applications.
In this chapter, we address this problem by building a DIFT system that is not inherently stable because it does track address and control dependencies, and then add an
open-loop control system that throttles how sensitive the DIFT tracking is to these dependencies. In our prototype relaxed static stability DIFT system, taint values are fixed point
numbers rather than single bits so that we can make approximations about the amount of
information flow (i.e., a byte can be tainted with 8.0 bit of taintedness, or 0.125 bits of
taintedness, etc.). The tags represent the mutual information between the data object the
tag is associated with and the taint source. Relaxed static stability will enable new applications that are impossible with traditional information flow controls or current
DIFT systems.
Other than the following two assumptions, there are no limitations to the possible
applications of relaxed static stability DIFT:
1. The attacker either cannot execute arbitrary code or does not know about the DIFT
tracking. We do not claim that our DIFT system can track information flow if arbitrary code is written with the express purpose of dropping the taint marks. This
is a very difficult problem, and many applications do not need such a strong threat
model.
2. Approximations of the true information flow are good enough so long as they capture the most important aspects of the information flow. In other words, as long as
the output tells the user of the DIFT system something meaningful about the true
information flow in the system, perfect accuracy from an information-theoretic perspective, which is impossible to achieve in practice, is not a requirement.
In this chapter, we present a relaxed static stability system that is based on an open
loop control system and use it to measure information flow from various taint sources
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into the control path of the CPU. The control path of the CPU includes what instructions
are executed, their operands, the data that conditional control flow decisions are based
on, and the addresses instructions are fetched from—these basically encompass what the
CPU is doing at any given time. While such a system could be used for detecting attacks,
e.g., in a similar spirit to Newsome et al.’s concept of undue influence [72], we make no
claims in this work in regards to supporting or refuting a claim that measuring information
flow into the control path of the CPU dynamically is a viable detection technique for
remote network attacks. Newsome et al. demonstrate that a static approach based on
the general idea of measuring this flow of information can distinguish attacks from false
alerts. Our results show that relaxed static stability can take meaningful measurements
of full-system information flow into the control path of the CPU dynamically, whether or
not this dynamic approach is useful specifically for detection in terms of false positive
and false negative rates is beyond the scope of this work. We chose this application only
because it is challenging and the flows of information are intuitive so that we can compare
measurement results to our intuitions.
Our claims are the following:

• Address and control dependencies are both critically important to track in
practical applications of DIFT. This has been pointed out in previous work [91, 89]

but always within the context of detecting control data attacks. Our results demonstrate that, especially when DIFT is applied to more general applications and real
systems, address and control dependencies are the rule of whole-system information
flow, not an exception.
• A relaxed static stability approach to DIFT enables information flow measure-

ments that are sensitive to address and control dependencies while still remaining stable. This is achieved because the competing design requirements of stability and accuracy are decoupled, so that accurate information flow measurement in
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future work will only be limited by the research community’s imagination in designing control systems. Our results demonstrate that, even with a relatively simple
open loop control system, accurately measuring full-system information flows (that
existing DIFT systems are not capable of measuring due to address and control dependencies) is possible.

3.2

Implementation

The first step in building our prototype was to generalize the notion of a tag from a single
taint bit to a fixed point number representing how tainted a data object is. In our system,
every byte of the registers and memory has a 16-bit fixed point number associated with
it, which represents how much tainted data is in that byte (measured in bits of entropy in
an information theoretic sense from 0.0 to 32.0). We chose this range because sometimes
in our DIFT system the taintedness of a 16-bit or 32-bit word is stored in its least significant byte. These tags constitute a 200% storage overhead, which is also an issue for
performance, but we discuss how this can be ameliorated in future work in Section 3.5.
When every byte in the system is augmented with a tag in this way, we can define taint
propagation rules and a source and sink of information flow and measure the amount of
information flow over time between the source and sink. Note that all of the tag propagation occurs at the architectural level in a virtual machine, based on raw bytes and machine
instructions. This means that full-system information flow measurement is possible and
no modification to the operating system or software being measured is necessary.
For our preliminary study, we define the source of tainted data to be the network (i.e.,
data from the attacker), and the sink to be the control path of the CPU (which instructions are fetched and what data is used for control flow decisions). By measuring the
information flow over time between this source and sink we can approximate how much
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control the attacker has over what the CPU is doing, even if their inputs are high-level shell
commands or script code. This allows for a very general definition of attack: the more information flow from the network into the CPU control path, the more likely it is that the
system has been attacked. This definition of attack, unlike existing DIFT-based honeypot
technologies [34, 80], makes no assumptions about how the attacker gained control of the
system, i.e., it does not matter if the exploit is a buffer overflow, script injection, a guessed
password, or any other type of remote intrusion.
To implement the source and sink, we taint all data that comes from the network card
of the virtual machine (with 8.0 bits of taint for a byte, 16.0 bits for a word, and 32.0 bits
for a double word). Using a moving average filter, we plot the amount of tainted data
that is used in the control path of the CPU (fetched instructions, data used for conditional
control flow decisions, and control data).
Our prototype is built on top of Argos [80], which is itself built on top of the QEMU
emulator for the x86 architecture, and handles the five dependencies defined by Suh et
al. [91] as follows:
• Copy dependencies: When data is copied from register to register, memory to register, or register to memory its taint tag is also copied from source to destination. For

load instructions, a throttle constant of 0.99 is multiplied by the loaded taint value
and then stored in both the destination and source. Note that address and control
dependencies can also affect copy operations.
• Computation dependencies: When an operation is performed on one or more

source operands and stored in a destination, the maximum taint of the source operands

is stored in the destination taint tag. Note that address and control dependencies can
also affect computation operations.
• Load and store address dependencies: If the address of a load or store operation,

when multiplied by a constant address dependency throttling factor of 1.0 (i.e., we
are not currently throttling address dependencies), has a taint value that is greater
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than the source (or maximum of the sources), then the taint value of the address,
instead of the taint value of the data, is copied to the destination’s taint tag.
• Control dependencies: When tainted data is used for conditional control flow decisions (e.g., x or y in the C code “if (x == y)” that will be compiled into a

compare instruction followed a conditional jump in assembly), the program counter
is tainted with the maximum taint of the values compared. This is implemented by
tainting condition flags for compare instructions, and checking the taint of flags used
in conditional control flow transfers. If the program counter is currently tainted and
its taint, when multiplied by another throttle factor, is greater than that of the taint
value of the source of a copy or computation operation, the destination is tagged
with the higher taint value instead. This makes tracking of control dependencies
possible. The throttle factor for the program counter is currently set to the constant
0.5, but could be varied dynamically in future work with a closed loop controller. If
a tainted flag is used and its taint value is copied to the program counter, the taint
value of the flag is multiplied by the constant throttle factor of 0.99 for reasons explained below. For every instruction where the control flow is not based on tainted
data the program counter’s taint level is multiplied by 0.99. The amount of taintedness in the CPU control path is calculated for each instruction as a moving average
y of the program counter’s taintedness e, using the equation y ′ = cy + (1 − c)e with
c = 0.999511719 =

2047
.
2048

(This is the y-axis for all figures in Section 3.4.)

Also, address dependencies are only enabled when the CPU is not in supervisory mode,
i.e., these dependencies are only applied in user space. This is satisfactory for most applications, but with more advanced control systems tracking these dependencies in the kernel
space will also be possible if necessary. Control, copy, and computation dependencies are
tracked throughout the entire system, including the kernel.
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3.2.1

Design decisions

The above design decisions are the result of extensive testing to develop a controller that
was both stable and sensitive to the information flow being measured. The load throttle
constant of 0.99, which is applied to the taint of loaded values in memory where they
are stored, was necessary because in our experiments many values are stored to memory
once and then read many times, becoming endless sources of taintedness. We found that
forcing the taintedness of values that sit in memory to decay over time is essential for
system stability. By having a high value for this constant, it only affects these problematic
values in a significant way and normal data that has a shorter lifetime is not significantly
affected. The other constants (0.5 for the program counter throttle, 0.99 for conditional
control flow loop throttling, and 0.99 for the program counter decay) were also the result
of extensive testing to make the system as sensitive as possible without becoming unstable.
The value of c = 0.999511719 was chosen as the highest value for c, i.e., the one that keeps
the most history in each iteration, that could be represented in our fixed point format which
uses 5 bits for the whole part and 11 bits for the fractional part.
Our current prototype uses an open loop control system, based on a moving average
filter and multiplying by constant throttle factors. Also, it uses the maximum of multiple taint values, instead of addition. From an information theoretic point of view, the
maximum operation assumes the maximum joint entropy between tainted variables while
addition assumes zero joint entropy. The actual amount of information flow will typically
be somewhere in between these two extremes. Still, because of the power of the relaxed
static stability approach, our prototype produces very good results when measuring the
information flow between the network and the CPU control path.
In building our prototype, we discovered the importance of loop structures in building
relaxed static stability DIFT systems. Consider the example of a control dependency from
Section 3.1:
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if (x == 1)
y = 1;
else
y = 0;

In our DIFT scheme, the taint value of x will be copied to the program counter when
the if condition is checked, and then transferred from the program counter to y (and
multiplied by the program counter throttle of 0.5) when the value of y is set. This has the
desired effect from an information flow perspective, and is similar in concept to Fenton’s
Data Mark Machine [43, 44]. Now consider the following loop where Y is an array.
while (x > 0)
{
x = x - 1;
Y[x] = 1;
}

Ignoring the address dependencies, we can see why the condition check taint values
need to be throttled. If x = 1000 and the tag of x is tainted with 3.5 bits of information,
then without throttling each element of the array Y will be tainted with 3.5 bits. This
means that from 3.5 bits of tainted information we will have generated 3500 bits of tainted
information. This obviously violates the law of the conservation of information in a problematic, unbounded way. By throttling the taint value of the condition flags for x each
time they are checked by multiplying by 0.99, we can ensure that, in this example, at most
1
1−0.99

× H(x) = 100 × H(x) (in this case, 350) bits of taint is generated in Y by the

conditions on x. This is still more entropy than existed before the loop but is bounded by
a geometric series. Because of the many subtleties of information theory, any practical
DIFT system is an approximation, including ours. For future work in accurate DIFT systems based on relaxed static stability we anticipate that the information theory of looping
constructs [65] will be of critical importance.
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3.3

Experimental methodology

We tested our system with a variety of attacks and in other scenarios involving high-level
languages, and also using controlled rates. Our experimental methodology was designed
to answer the following questions:

1. Are the measurement results of our DIFT system repeatable? Because of CPU
scheduling, time dilation in the virtual machine, and other factors measurements
are not deterministic. They should be repeatable in the sense that any measurement
result is representative of a ground truth, however. We repeated a particular attack
(the Code Red worm) ten times to ensure this.
2. Are address and control dependencies critical to measuring information flow?
We disabled address and control dependency tracking in our DIFT system, both
together and individually, for all attacks to assess this for our motivating application.
3. Do the information flow measurements of our DIFT system match intuitions
about what the actual amount of information flow is? While defining a ground
truth for the actual amount of information flow based on information theory to compare our measurements to is infeasible due to the various subtleties of information
flow, if the measurements show what is going on in the system in a meaningful way
then the measurement results are accurate enough to be valuable in many applications. We tested attacks for this purpose, and we also tested information flow in
controlled situations.
4. Does tracking address and control dependencies allow us to measure information flow into the CPU’s control path even when the tainted code is in a highlevel language? To answer this question, we tainted Dhrystone binary or source
code in four formats: compiled binary code (from C), Java byte code, Perl code, and
Python code.

42

Chapter 3. Secure and Usable DIFT System for Intrusion Detection
In Section 3.4, our results answer all of these questions in the affirmative. We also took
the following steps to ensure that the interpretation of our results was clear:
• We compare the information flow from source to sink (i.e., network to CPU control

path) during attacks to the information flow for the same exact network request
against a non-vulnerable version of the system. In other words, we repeat the attack

against a patched version of the system. This ensures that the differences between
an attack and its baseline are due to the attacker taking control of the system, and
not due to differences of protocol usage and other system factors.
• For repeatability reasons, we disabled automatic updates when necessary, and performed all measurements against an idle system.

Table 3.1 shows the eleven attacks that we tested our DIFT system with. Though
several of them were exploited by high-profile worms (e.g., 8205 for Blaster, 5310 for
Slammer, and 10108 for Sasser) we tested all but one of them using publicly available
exploits that simply spawn a remote shell that the attacker can subsequently connect to.
The exception is the Code Red worm, based on the IIS Server ISAPI buffer overflow
(2880), which we tested with the Code Red worm itself.
Note that only a few of the attacks we tested are simple buffer overflows where information flows directly from the network to a piece of control data, which is the type
of attack that traditional DIFT systems have been able to catch [91, 34, 73, 32, 80]. The
ASN.1 heap corruption vulnerability and the IIS Server ISAPI buffer overflow both have
address dependencies because of format conversions. The format string vulnerability in
Nullsoft SHOUTcast has both address and control dependencies, as do all format string
vulnerabilities. The two web browser vulnerabilities are both attacks that are initiated
when the victim visits a web page controlled by the attacker, and the first phase of the
attack is JavaScript code to spray the heap [98]. We purposely chose a diverse variety of
attacks for testing to demonstrate the power of relaxed static stability DIFT to measure
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Vulnerability
ASN.1 Integer Overflow
ASN.1 Heap Corruption
DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow
Nullsoft SHOUTcast Format String
MS-SQL Resolution Service Heap Overflow
MS-SQL Authentication Buffer Overflow
LSASS Buffer Overflow
NetDDE Buffer Overflow
Internet Explorer MPEG2TuneRequest
Firefox 3.5 TraceMonkey
IIS Server ISAPI Buffer Overflow

bugtraq ID [106]
9633
13300
8205
12096
5310
5411
10108
11372
35558
35660
2880

Table 3.1: Attacks we tested our DIFT system with.

information flow in general. Recall that we make no claims about the application of these
results to detection with good false positive and false negative rates. Our aim is to show
the potential of information flow to revolutionize the way we think about IDS and shed
light on research directions that can make this happen.

3.4

Results

In this section we present results to support the two main claims in regards to our DIFT
prototype, that tracking address and control dependencies is both: (1) necessary for meaningful measurements of the information flow in a real system, and (2) made possible by a
relaxed static stability approach.

3.4.1

Graph legend and axes

All graphs in this section, unless otherwise noted, have the following axes and legend.
The x-axis is time in increments of 50 milliseconds, i.e., 100 on the x-axis is equal to 5
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seconds. Note that time can be dilated by the performance overhead of the virtual machine.
The y-axis is equivalent to the rate of information flow from source to sink (in something
proportional to bits per second), so can be interpreted as the amount of tainted information
from the network that is flowing into the control path of the CPU at that time.
Time dilation is a factor since our moving average is applied on a per-instruction basis
while the value itself is sampled (for the graphs) based on time. Another caveat is that we
have applied an additional moving average filter of c = 0.99 to all of the graphs in this
section to make them more readable. Where more than one line appears in a graph, the
lines are independent tests plotted approximately on the same axis for comparison. Where
one or more lines are omitted from a graph, it is because they were effectively zero and
indistinguishable from the x-axis.
Results of tests against vulnerable versions of operating systems and services follow
the legend shown in Figure 3.1. Solid black lines are tests where we utilize the full power
of relaxed static stability DIFT, and track all dependencies (including address and control
dependencies) as described in Section 3.2. We also sought to assess the importance of
address and control dependencies individually. Solid grey lines are tests where control,
copy, and computation dependencies are tracked but address dependencies are disabled by
ignoring the taint of addresses for loads and stores (all other taints propagate in the same
way). Black dotted lines are tests where address, copy, and computation dependencies are
tracked but control dependencies are disabled by setting the control dependency throttle to
0.0 instead of 0.5.
Grey dots are tests where only copy and computation dependencies are tracked, and
both address and control dependencies are disabled. Modulo two caveats, this can be
viewed as how a typical standard DIFT system [91, 34, 73, 32, 80] would perform. The
two caveats are that we still apply a load throttle of 0.99 to loaded values in this case,
and the moving average filter has the effect of smoothing out small bursts of measured
information flow.
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Figure 3.1: Legend for vulnerability results.

Figure 3.2: Legend for invulnerable baseline results.

Figure 3.2 shows the legend for results of tests against invulnerable (i.e., patched) versions of operating systems, while tracking all dependencies including address and control.
This means that the test uses the same protocols as the tests against vulnerable versions, but
the exploit where control flow is taken over by the attacker does not succeed. This serves
as a baseline to compare an attack to that ensures that the differences are only related to
the success of the attack and not the protocols involved. These tests are represented with a
dashed black line.

3.4.2

Basic results

Figure 3.3 shows the result of the Code Red worm attacking our DIFT system running
a vulnerable version of IIS web server and Windows 2000. Recall that for Code Red,
unlike the other tests in this section, the exploit we used is the actual worm itself rather
than an exploit that binds a shell to a port and goes to sleep. It is clear that our DIFT
system is able to measure the rapid increase in information flow from the network to the
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control path of the CPU when the worm takes control of the machine. The falloff at
the end occurs when all 100 threads that Code Red spawns complete their initial TCP/IP
requests and go into a sleep state waiting for remote victims to respond with SYN/ACK
packets. From this figure it is also clear that both address and control dependencies, and in
particular their interactions together, are a critical part of this. All three of the other tests,
where address or control dependencies or both are disabled, are indistinguishable from the
baseline invulnerable case shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4 shows the same network traffic of a Code Red infection, but directed at an
invulnerable web server (patched by installing service pack 4 for Windows 2000). The
same initial bump, from about x = 50 to x = 150, can be seen in both figures. This is the
initial HTTP protocol processing where the web server is processing a request that contains
malformed UNICODE encodings. The difference between the two graphs is that in the
invulnerable version control flow is never hijacked by overwriting a structured exception
handler on the stack, meaning the web server returns a 404 page not found and
closes the connection and the worm never remotely gains control of the machine.

Figure 3.3: Code Red attacking a vulnerable version of Windows 2000 and IIS web
server.
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Figure 3.4: Code Red attacking an invulnerable version of Windows 2000 and IIS web
server.

3.4.3

Repeatability

Figure 3.5: Code Red attacking a vulnerable VM, repeated.

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the same tests as Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively, repeated
ten times in each case. Due to time dilation of the virtual machine and system nondeterminism due to process/thread scheduling, we repeated these tests to demonstrate that the
graphs produced by our DIFT system are repeatable and representative of the same ground
truth for a given test. All of the results in this section that we repeated had this property.
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Figure 3.6: Code Red attacking an invulnerable VM, repeated.

3.4.4

Importance of address and control dependencies

Figure 3.7: 9633 (ASN.1 Integer Overflow).

All of the tests for other exploits that we tested our DIFT system with support our
conclusions that address and control dependencies are important and that relaxed static
stability DIFT can track these dependencies accurately. Each exploit proved to have unique
features as well.
Note that the graphs for the various exploits do not have the same scale on the x- and
y-axes. Our prototype DIFT system was built to demonstrate the concept of relaxed static
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Figure 3.8: 13300 (ASN.1 Heap Corruption).

Figure 3.9: 8205 (DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow).

stability DIFT and the importance of tracking address and control dependencies. To be
used for something like detection in a honeypot scenario, other application-specific concerns would need to be accounted for, in particular the difference of scale between various
exploits. In this work we use the honeypot application as a vehicle for demonstrating relaxed static stability DIFT in an intuitive way, we make no claims about being able to apply
our current DIFT system as a honeypot in a real environment with good false positive and
false negative rates.
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Figure 3.10: 12096 (Nullsoft SHOUTcast Format String).

Figure 3.11: 5310 (MS-SQL Resolution Service Heap Overflow).

Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the results for exploits for two different vulnerabilities in the
ASN.1 parser in Windows. It is interesting that Figure 3.7 shows control dependencies
as a major driver of the information flow while Figure 3.8 shows the same for address
dependencies. ASN.1 is an XML-like format for binary data, so various encodings and
lookup tables are involved when decoding the raw bytes that come from the network.
Another interesting note is that the exploit for 13300 is one that conventional DIFT systems
aimed at detecting control data attacks [91, 34, 73, 32, 80] will not detect when control
flow is hijacked because the exploit overwrites a pointer to a function pointer, not the
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Figure 3.12: 5411 (MS-SQL Authentication Buffer Overflow).

function pointer itself, meaning that there is a 32-bit address dependency in the corruption
of the control data.
Figure 3.9 shows test results using the exploit that was used by the Blaster worm.
Without both address and control dependencies, the measured information flow is actually
less than that of the invulnerable test, meaning that it might not be possible to detect this
attack without tracking both address and control dependencies, and certainly would not be
possible without tracking either. This also shows that it is not just a matter of tracking both
address and control dependencies, but the interdependencies between address and control
dependencies are important as well. Figure 3.10 shows the same, and Figures 3.11 and 3.14
also show results where the vulnerable and invulnerable tests are indistinguishable unless
both address and control dependencies are tracked. Figure 3.12 is interesting in that the
information flow is driven almost entirely by address dependencies.
There are two interesting aspects to Figure 3.13. This exploit is the same exploit that
was used by the Sasser worm. To exploit the buffer overflow in Windows’ LSASS service,
the attacker opens a TCP/IP connection directly to the Windows kernel and sends various
commands to open a named pipe, write some data into the named pipe, etc. On an unpatched Windows XP machine with no service packs, this is not in itself an attack but is
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Figure 3.13: 10108 (LSASS Buffer Overflow).

Figure 3.14: 11372 (NetDDE Buffer Overflow).

actually a feature that Windows allows. Thus, the attacker does have a large amount of
control over the control path of the CPU even before overflowing the buffer, so it is not
surprising that the vulnerable and invulnerable tests are indistinguishable in terms of magnitude. One distinguishing factor is that the vulnerable case shows two phases (instructing
the kernel to do various IPC operations, and then executing arbitrary code) whereas the
invulnerable version has only one phase (instructing the kernel to do various IPC operations). Another distinguishing feature is the extra increase in information flow (i.e., the
“bump” in the vulnerable test at about x = 550). Through repeated tests we confirmed
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(a) Normal

(b) Compressed

Figure 3.15: Measured information flow for controlled rates.

that this bump is when the attacker connects to the shell that has been bound to a TCP/IP
port, and represents an increase in control because the attacker has initiated a command
shell. If the attacker types any commands into this shell, there is a significant increase in
the measured information flow to the control path of the CPU.
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3.4.5

Controlled rates

We also tested our DIFT system’s measurements with controlled rates to determine if the
measurement outputs matched the rates that we set. For these experiments we used the
CD-ROM as the taint source and repeatedly copied different compiled dhrystone binaries
(to avoid the effects of disk caching) from the CD-ROM to a RAM disk and executed
them. For the normal uncompressed case, we fixed the rate at which we did this at 0.8
repititions of this per second, 0.4 repetitions per second, and 0.2 repetitions per second,
corresponding to the “Full,” “Half,” and “Quarter” experiments in Figure 3.15(a). Figure 3.15(b) is the compressed experiments that were set at

2
3

per second for “Full.” The

full rates were different because the unzipping of the Dhrystone binary takes some extra
time. We modified the Dhrystone binary to perform fewer loops per execution so that each
execution takes between 1 and 2 seconds.
For the first set of experiments, shown in Figure 3.15(a), we simply copied each raw
binary and executed it. For the second set of experiments, shown in Figure 3.15(b), the
binaries had been compressed using gzip on the CD-ROM so they were copied, uncompressed to introduce additional address and control dependencies, and then executed. For
both sets of experiments, the rates measured generally corresponded to the controlled rate
in terms of relative magnitudes. There was a small effect of time dilation that made the
measured values not exactly proportional. Table 3.15(a) shows the integral rates over
time, normalized to the full rate, which is closer to proportional. These results show that,
although the measured values of our DIFT system have no meaningful units without calibration, the measurements can be calibrated to the actual amount of information flow
in bits per second. Without tracking address and control dependencies, Figures 3.15(a)
and 3.15(b) show some information flow is measured in the simple case but the information flow is barely perceptible without tracking the address and control dependencies in
gzip.
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Actual
Uncompressed
Compressed
Rate
Measurement
Measurement
(Controlled) (Figure 3.15(a)) (Figure 3.15(b))
Full (1.0)
1.0
1.0
Half (0.50)
0.60
0.58
Quarter (0.25)
0.31
0.30
Table 3.2: Rate measurement integrals over time, normalized to full rate.

3.4.6

High-level languages

(a) C on the left, Java on the right.

(b) Perl on the left, Python on the right.

Figure 3.16: High-level languages.

Another important question to answer is if relaxed static stability DIFT can measure
information flow from a tainted source into the control path of the CPU for arbitrary code,
even when that code is in a high-level interpreted language. Any DIFT system that does
not track address and control dependencies will not detect this information flow because
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there are many table lookups and conditional control flow transfers involved when any
interpreter or just-in-time compiler is parsing and executing a high level language. Figures 3.16(a) and 3.16(b) show the results of tracking tainted Dhrystone code in compiled
binary format (from C), Java byte code, Perl, and Python, respectively. Clearly, address
and control dependencies are important for high-level language execution, and relaxed
static stability DIFT performs well in all four cases.

Browser exploits

(a) Firefox 3.5 on the left, Firefox 3.5.1 on the right.

(b) Internet Explorer 6 on the left, Internet Explorer 7 on the right.

Figure 3.17: Heap-spraying browser exploits.

In July 2009, two browser vulnerabilities were announced: one for Internet Explorer
and one for Firefox. The Firefox vulnerability was fixed in Firefox version 3.5.1, while the
Internet Explorer vulnerability existed in both Internet Explorer 6 and Internet Explorer
7. The results of testing these four browser versions against their respective exploits, with
Firefox 3.5.1 being invulnerable, are shown in Figures 3.17(a) and 3.17(b). The interesting
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thing about these graphs is that the information flow from the network into the control
path of the CPU after the browser visits a web page with the exploit is largely due to heap
spraying [98] and not the exploitation of the vulnerability itself. Thus it represents a high
system load due to Javascript that has been crafted by the attacker.

3.5

Discussion and future work

We anticipate that relaxed static stability DIFT will open up new research possibilities for
security applications and benefit from future advances in accuracy and performance due to
the application of more advanced control theory. The key to future work on relaxed static
stability DIFT will be the accuracy vs. performance tradeoff. More accurate information
flow measurements for a variety of applications will be possible with dynamic feedback
control systems [51], but storing a fixed point number for every byte in the system will be
prohibitive for the performance of some applications.
Hardware support is one way to increase performance, which can be integrated into
the processor core [91, 34], and designed for flexible policies [39, 81] or decoupled on
a separate coprocessor [55]. Many of these systems perform some form of compression
to reduce storage overhead and memory bandwidth usage. On-demand emulation [52]
has been shown to yield near-native performance for some workloads, and performance
improvements for DIFT on commodity hardware have been demonstrated by parallelizing
the security checks on multicore systems [74]. Many of these performance enhancements
exploit the fact that large portions of memory are untainted. It is not clear if this applies
to relaxed static stability DIFT systems, since the tag represents a degree of taintedness
and many objects in the system will be tainted, at least slightly, by address and control
dependencies. One possible approach to achieving a form of compression for relaxed
static stability DIFT would be to perform a form of interpolation similar to that performed
by graphics processors, e.g., taint tags could be calculated based on density fields rather
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than stored in and loaded from a large tag memory. Another possibility is probabilistic
tagging, where a single tag bit or small number of tag bits is associated with each byte,
and probabilistic tag propagation is used to approximate the information flow.
While we do not claim to have built a DIFT system that, in its current form, detects a
wide variety of attacks in a general way with low false positives and false negatives, our
results show that this approach can be very promising if DIFT technology addresses a
few specific challenges in future research. The fact that we were able to measure information flow in a manner that is both stable and matches our intuitions about the attacks
tested means that intrusion detection via information flow measurements is possible. If the
research community builds a new foundation for information flow research that is focused
on integrity, availability, and intrusion detection then we can succeed where confidentiality
systems of the past failed. This is because the precision that confidentiality applications
require is not necessarily required in other settings. As Salvador Dali said, “Have no fear
of perfection, you’ll never reach it.”

3.6

Related Work

DIFT in the context of detecting attacks was introduced by Suh et al. [91]. TaintBochs [28]
was another early application of tainting that was applied to analyzing data lifetime in a full
system. The Minos project [34, 36] explored various policy tradeoffs for DIFT schemes
and higher-level systems issues such as virtual memory swapping, TaintCheck [73] explored some of the issues of using DIFT for end-to-end detection of exploits for vulnerabilities in commodity software, and Vigilante [32] employed DIFT for automated worm
defense. Argos [80] is a widely-deployed honeypot technology based on DIFT. DIFT has
been applied to problems outside the domain of detecting control data attacks, such as
malware analysis [103, 102, 18], network protocol analysis [62, 99], and dataflow tomography [69]. This shows that DIFT is a general technique with a broad range of applications,
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but a relaxed static stability approach to DIFT will greatly multiply the possible applications, since address and control dependencies are so prevalent in so many applications.
The Panorama project [103] demonstrated the power of full-system dynamic information flow tracking. However, the way that address and control dependencies are handled
in Panorama is application specific. A control dependency in the UNICODE conversion
of keystrokes was handled via manual labeling. Also, all load address dependencies are
propagated in Panorama so that ASCII to UNICODE conversions and other table lookups
are handled appropriately. This propagation rule was stable for the applications Panorama
was applied to, but is not stable in general [36, 89], especially when combined with store
address dependencies.
The earliest DIFT papers [91, 34] identified the problems with address and control dependencies. More details and analysis of these issues followed [33, 26, 38, 78], including a
recent quantitative analysis of full-system pointer tainting [89]. Flexible tainting schemes
that allow taint policies to be specified [91, 73, 97, 81, 39, 31] often allow for address
and control dependencies to be incorporated into the policy, but do not fundamentally
address the stability issue. Policies written for these systems that incorporate address dependencies usually tradeoff accuracy for stability by ignoring other dependencies such as
computation dependencies. Although it is possible to specify policies that track all dependencies in these schemes, the overtainting problem will lead to a system where everything
is tainted. Based on the empirical evidence of five years of DIFT research, we believe
that no stable, conventional DIFT system can accurately track both address and control dependencies in a general way. This is our motivation for proposing a relaxed
static stability approach.
Dynamic information flow systems that have confidentiality as their primary goal [43,
44, 95, 93] have the same overtainting problem. This is because they are based on a
conservative notion of confidentiality as a noninterference property. This is necessary
for, e.g., multi-level secure systems, but for many practical confidentiality concerns such
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as data provenance and accidental leaks of information noninterference is not necessary.
Overtainting in confidentiality systems is due to the fact that, within the context of noninterference, information does flow throughout the system in a pervasive manner. This is
compounded by the fact that, without some form of static analysis, implicit flows must be
handled conservatively by tainting every object in the entire system.
Fenton’s Data Mark Machine [43, 44] requires a special instruction set to define when
the program counter can be untainted, and also requires that all registers in the system be
statically assigned as tainted or untainted. Thus, a practical compiler for Fenton’s system
would need to know the taint value of every piece of data at every possible program point,
which implies that the compiler has already identified all control dependencies through
static analysis. RIFLE [95] was applied to the Itanium instruction set, but in the absence of
assertions about possible implicit flows (provided by static analysis) RIFLE will basically
taint every data object in the system on a conditional control transfer. GLIFT [93] makes
strong guarantees of noninterference at the bit level, but translating this into a practical
information flow tracking system will not be possible without static analysis. For all of
these systems, in the absence of static analysis to make assertions about code that does
not execute, every conditional control flow transfer must taint every piece of data in the
system.
Decentralized information flow control (DIFC) [68] is a concept based on information
flow that relaxes the requirement of noninterference while still making confidentiality and
integrity guarantees. Several systems [40, 105, 57] have been based on DIFC or similar
ideas. These full-system information flow tracking systems are similar in spirit to DIFT,
but the applications and implementations of DIFC are fundamentally different from DIFT
and are largely based on manual declassification. DIFC systems work at a higher level of
abstraction than DIFT systems. While DIFC systems can track information flow for a full
system, they do not address the problem that DIFT systems have of dealing with address
and control dependencies.

61

Chapter 3. Secure and Usable DIFT System for Intrusion Detection
Newsome et al. [72] present a method for detecting attacks that is based on measuring
information flow into the control path of the CPU. Their approach is a purely static approach, for static approaches methods for dealing with address and control dependencies
are known. The only connection Newsome et al. has to DIFT is that they use DIFT traces
as a loop-free program for input to their static analysis.
McCamant and Ernst [66] propose a technique for quantifying information flow that
is not based on tainting. It combines static and dynamic analysis to observe one or more
program executions and calculate a network flow capacity. TightLip [104] is a related
approach, but is purely dynamic and only observes two program executions to check for
non-interference.
To summarize, all existing DIFT schemes can be categorized into two extremes: either
they are stable at the cost of missing important information flows, or they are unstable
to the point of being entirely impractical without static analysis1 . Relaxed static stability
DIFT moves the possible design constraints beyond this dilemma and will enable new
DIFT applications, in much the same way as the analogous approach in aircraft design has
led to the design of aircraft with advanced stealth and maneuverability capabilities.

3.7

Conclusion

We showed that information flow has the potential to revolutionize intrusion detection systems and identified specific research challenges for dynamic information flow tracking will
help us to achieve this. Our relaxed static stability DIFT system prototype gave intuitive
results at measuring the information flow between the network and the control path of the
CPU. This is something that could be used in a general definition of intrusion that escapes
1 Note

that “static” in the sense of static analysis means something different than in the context
of stability. In the former case static means that the code is not executed dynamically for analysis,
in the latter it means the system as designed, without its integrated dynamic control system.
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the limitations of current appearance- and behavior-based definitions. Whereas signatures
and sequences of system calls define known bad behaviors, information flow can be used
to define what it means for an attacker to attack a system at a very fundamental level. We
would be honored to attend NSPW and foster a discussion centered around the following
thought experiment: How would we design the IDS systems of the future if we could
assume that all of our wishes for dynamic information flow tracking had come true?
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Chapter 4
Antivirus Security: Timing Channel
Attacks Against Antivirus Software
Remote attackers use network reconnaissance techniques, such as port scanning, to gain
information about a victim machine and then use this information to launch an attack.
Current network reconnaissance techniques, that are typically below the application layer,
are limited in the sense that they can only give basic information, such as what services
a victim is running. Furthermore, modern remote exploits typically come from a server
and attack a client that has connected to it, rather than the attacker connecting directly
to the victim. In this chapter, we raise this question and answer it: Can the attacker go
beyond the traditional techniques of network reconnaissance and gain high-level, detailed
information?
We investigate remote timing channel attacks against ClamAV antivirus and show that
it is possible, with high accuracy, for the remote attacker to check how up-to-date the
victim’s antivirus signature database is. Because the strings the attacker uses to do this are
benign (i.e., they do not trigger the antivirus) and the attack can be accomplished through
many different APIs, the attacker has a large amount of flexibility in hiding the attack.
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4.1

Introduction

Network reconnaissance is a vital step for the remote attacker before launching an attack.
Attacking every reachable host is not desirable to the attacker because only vulnerable
hosts can be successfully penetrated. Port scanning is a well-known technique that provides the attacker with very useful information about possible victims. The attacker wants
to know if the victim is running certain services, and determines this by sending packets
to certain ports the victim might be listening on. The communication between the attacker
and victims could reveal the victims’ specific services and operating system, and even
version information. Port scanning, while helpful to the attacker, is limited by the kind
of information it can attain and by the ability to reach victims that have contacted the attacker from behind Network Address Translation (NAT). Stateful firewalls and intrusion
detection systems, if well deployed and configured, are considered strong defense lines
against port scanning. Also, maintaining stealth is important. In this chapter, we explore
techniques to remotely gain detailed high-level information about a victim host that has
connected to the attacker’s web server. Our goal is to better understand how the future
network reconnaissance techniques that network defenders must anticipate will work.

4.1.1

Application-level reconnaissance

We are particularly interested in the ability of the remote attacker to learn about victims
beyond traditional techniques. The highest level of information the attacker can obtain
is information related to the victims’ running applications, particularly security-related
applications. Vulnerable applications, firewalls, and antivirus software are of interest to
the attacker. We take the antivirus application in our study as a running example and
show how the attacker can stealthily gain information about the victims’ antivirus. In this
example, the attacker creates a timing channel to infer how up-to-date the antivirus is. This
could be useful in that the attacker could decide to send older versions of malicious code
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and thereby limit the exposure of their newest version by only using it when necessary.
In traditional network scanning, the remote attacker scans victims by the means of being
a client who tries to connect to servers and discover vulnerabilities. In our model, the
attacker is modeled as a server who waits for clients’ connections and then scans them at
the application layer. This model is particularly suited to drive-by-downloads.

4.1.2

Threat model

While modern antivirus software employs advanced techniques such as filtering, algorithmic scanning, and emulation, at its heart antivirus is still based on pattern matching. Note
that the filters that trigger algorithmic scanning and emulation are still pattern-based, and
advanced techniques also amortize their performance and therefore offer opportunities for
timing channels.
An antivirus scanning engine scans data against its virus signatures. The antivirus does
not compare data to every single signature sequentially, but rather it stores the signatures in
data structures that allow for fast scanning that is optimized for the common case (typical
strings of bytes) and amortizes the performance overhead by having slow code paths that
are only taken when a byte string is close to a signature in the database in some way.
Depending on how the antivirus stores the signatures in the data structures, scanning one
piece of data can take a longer time than another based on the scanning path the antivirus
takes to determine if the data is malicious or benign. Suppose that the attacker knows
how the antivirus scanning works, then they can create special crafted data that makes the
antivirus take a longer time if a certain signature is in the database, but less time otherwise.
In our threat model, the attacker wants to know if a client’s antivirus database is updated
with a certain signature or not. Although the attacker is modeled as a server in our threat
model, she can be modeled as a malicious insider as well.
The fundamental principle the antivirus software utilizes is making the common case
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fast. However, this introduces the possibility of timing channel attacks.

4.1.3

Why antivirus?

Having antivirus software is considered essential for typical computers today. According
to a study [4], 81 percent of users use antivirus on their computers. Antivirus signature
databases vary widely in terms of how up-to-date they are, due to both users who have not
updated recently and scaled releases of updates. An attacker need not use a more recent
malicious code, and thereby increase the exposure of the more recent code, if a user’s
antivirus signatures are not up-to-date and an older malicious code will suffice.
We chose ClamAV antivirus in our study because it is an open source antivirus.

4.1.4

Why timing channels?

The benefit of a timing channel attack is flexibility and stealth. Even though the attacker
might be able to directly check how up-to-date the antivirus’ database files are through ActiveX controls or other APIs that allow direct checking of directories, files, and processes,
this suspicious behavior will have a distinct behavioral signature that is difficult for the
attacker to obfuscate (e.g., opening the antivirus’ signature database). Also, the database
files could be hidden or not allowed to be reached by the attacker in the first place. So,
indirectly inferring how up to date the database is is preferable from the attacker’s point of
view.
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4.2

Background

4.2.1

On-access vs. on-demand scanning

On-access scanning is triggered upon file system operations, such as open, create, or close
system calls. To be scanned with the on-access scanner, a virus should be read from or
written to the disk. On-access scanners run as daemons and hook into the file system APIs
or are implemented as device drivers that are attached to the file system [92]. On-demand
scanning starts only if the user asks the scanner to scan some files.

4.2.2

ClamAV antivirus

ClamAV [2] is a well-known, open source antivirus program. ClamAV consists of a main
library and a set of command line programs that make use of the APIs provided by the
library. On-access scanning in Windows is possible via Clam Sentinel (see below).

File type filtering
The ClamAV scanning engine has 10 different roots which correspond to 10 different file
types. These are GENERIC, PE, OLE2, HTML, MAIL, GRAPHICS, ELF, ASCII, NOT
USED, and MACH-O. ClamAV signatures are loaded into the data structures of those roots
depending on what kind of files a virus can infect. For example, if virus X infects PE files
and a signature X’ is generated for X, then X’ will be loaded into the data structures of the
PE root. When ClamAV scans a file, it checks the file type first to determine which root’s
signatures will be used to scan that file against. File type filtering speeds up the scanning
process by optimizing scans for file types where the entire file need not be scanned.
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Filtering step
To make scanning even faster, ClamAV implements an additional filtering step prior to
scanning. Every type root has its own filter. The filter can determine if a file is benign
before scanning it. The most important feature of these filters is that they do not have false
negatives but do have false positive. In other words, the filter will not let a file containing
a virus pass without being scanned, but if it can prove that the file is benign then no further
scanning is needed for that file. However, some other benign files might cause a hit in
the filter and thus will need to be scanned further. ClamAV implements a bit-level statemachine to match characters in the filter. The state machine has 8 states where each state is
represented by 1 bit. The state machine might have multiple active states at the same time
and thus multiple transitions might be taking place in parallel. Because ClamAV checks
input against the filter, any character can be good to start checking from. Thus, ClamAV
activates state 1 at each transition. An active state 1 is represented by 11111110. The
filter is an array, called B, of length 65536, where each element is 8 bits long. Figure 4.1
illustrates this. ClamAV chooses 8 characters carefully from each signature to add it to
the filter. Then, it iterates through the 8 characters and reads q-grams of length 2 at each
position. For example, if the 8-byte string of a signature is 0x001122334455667788, then
it changes the filter as in the following steps1 :

1. For position 1 of the string, execute B[0x0011] = B[0x0011] & 11111110. This says
that 0x0011 is satisfactory to start with.
2. For position 2: B[0x1122] = B[0x1122] & 11111101.
3. It continues in the same way for the following positions until the 7th position.
4. To mark the end of a string ClamAV has another array called End. For the previous
1 <<,

|, and & represent shift left, or, and and bitwise operations, respectively
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example, when position 7 is reached, the End array is changed to be End[0x7788] =
End[0x7788] & 10111111.

After ClamAV determines which type root an input belongs to, it checks the root’s
filter against the input. Searching the filter starts by setting the bit-level state machine to
1111111 (no active states). Then, ClamAV iterates through all input characters until it
finds a match or reports a negative result. At each character position, ClamAV reads 16
bits as q0 (q-gram equals 2) and performs this statement:
state = (state << 1) | B[q0], where state << 1 activates state 1 each time, and then it
checks if it finds a match by this statement:

match state end = state | End[q0], and reports a match if match state end != 0xff. In other

words, it reports a match when reaching a state at which the input can end at while being
in an active state. Because this filter is created by applying this procedure to all of the
signatures, a string will not pass the filtering step unless it cannot possibly match any
signature.

Figure 4.1: ClamAV filter. The filter content is based on the signatures. An active
position is represented by 0. The right most bit is the first position.
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Aho-Corasick algorithm
ClamAV uses an extended version of Aho-Corasick algorithm [12]. ClamAV usually uses
this algorithm for signatures that have wildcards. In this case, the signature is divided
into patterns that need to be matched in order to report a match. This algorithm is used
to match an input against many patterns at the same time. ClamAV uses a tree-like data
structure, called a trie, to store patterns. Each node in this data structure has 256 transition
pointers. Each transition represents an ASCII character. What distinguishes this data
structure is that each node has the same prefix as its predecessor nodes up to the root
node, so that all patterns with the same prefix will take the same path. Because each node
takes a considerable amount of memory and also because the trie could be very large if
not restricted, ClamAV has put a maximum limit for the depth to be 3. After reaching the
maximum depth, all patterns will be added to a linked list attached to leaf nodes. Suppose
that there is a signature that starts with the sequence 0x010002. Figure 4.2 shows the
transitions in the ClamAV trie structure that this sequence would take. Once the leaf node
is reached, the pattern will be added to the linked list of patterns which have the same
prefix. Also, fail transitions are established, so that instead of returning back to the root at
every mismatch, a fail transition is made to the proper node. For example, if the next input
at node 2 is 0x01, then the fail transition is set to go back to node 2 instead of re-matching
starting again from node 1.

Boyer-Moore Algorithm
An extended version of Boyer-Moore algorithm [21] is used in ClamAV. This algorithm
is usually used for signatures which do not have wildcards. The original Boyer-Moore
algorithm scans patterns against input from right to left. Two tables are used to determine
how many characters the pattern needs to be shifted by. The two tables are built based on
two roles, the bad character shift role and the good suffix shift role. For this algorithm,
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Figure 4.2: ClamAV Aho-Corasick trie structure with arbitrary success transitions
and one fail transition. Each transition represents an ASCII character. The maximum depth is 3. Patterns are added to linked lists after bypassing the maximum
depth.

ClamAV uses an array of linked lists to distribute the signatures among. To determine a
location for a signature in the array, ClamAV hashes 3 characters of the signature using a
hashing function. ClamAV tries to evenly distribute signatures in the array by trying the
next 3-character sequence of the signature if the first 3 collides, and so on.

4.2.3

ClamWin and Clam Sentinel

ClamWin is a free antivirus for Microsoft Windows and used by more than 600,000 users
worldwide on a daily basis [3]. It is based on the ClamAV scanning engine. ClamWin only
supports on-demand scanning. Clam Sentinel is a free program that works with ClamWin
to support on-access scanning.
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4.3

Experimental methodology

Our experimental methodology was designed to answer the following two questions:
Question #1: Is there an exploitable timing channel based on how new signatures
are added to ClamAV database? The basic idea behind the timing channel we demonstrate is to make the scanning engine hit in the place in which a signature is added over
and over again to add a measurable delay to the scan. If the signature is there, then more
work will take place and this means more scanning time. Three things are involved to
make this happen. First, for any input to be scanned against database signatures, it needs
to pass the filtering step. We extracted the exact 8 characters from each signature that are
added to the filter, see Section 4.2.2 for more details about how the filtering works. When
scanning files, ClamAV divides files into buffers of length 128KB. We need to make sure
to plant the extracted characters in a buffer size basis rather than a file size basis. Second,
for signatures that are added to the Boyer-Moore linked list, we extracted the characters
from each Boyer-Moore signature that is used in the hashing function to add the signature
to the linked lists, see Section 4.2.2 for more details about how the Boyer-Moore algorithm works. Third, for signatures that are added to the Aho-Corasick trie structure, we
extracted the characters from each Aho-Corasick signature that will cause the scanner to
go all the way down to the leaf nodes. See Section 4.2.2 for more details about how the
Aho-Corasick algorithm works.
To demonstrate a possible timing channel, we collected the names of all of the viruses
added since the first available ClamAV release, which was 17 April 2004. ClamAV maintains a virus database mailing list through which it reports virus addition or update. We
downloaded and parsed all the HTML files since that date and put the results in a namedate list. Then, we unpacked the ClamAV database and removed from it all of the signatures of viruses that have their names on our list. This step makes the database as if it
is the database from 17 April 2004. We made two kinds of experiments: the day-basis
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experiment and the signature-basis experiment. For the day-basis experiment, we wrote
a script that creates files per date/day. For example, if in date D S signatures are added
to the database, then the script will create the Directory D. Inside D the script creates S
directories each one corresponds to a virus signature. In each directory of S directories, the
script creates 10 files each of which is 1MB. See Figure 4.3. The number and size of the
files are below the default ClamAV limits to scan files. The 10 files’ contents are identical.
To create a file, we concatenate the extracted Boyer-Moore or Aho-Corasick characters
from the corresponding signature until it reaches 1MB size. Meanwhile, we plant the filter
characters of the signature every time we reach the buffer size. The initial content of the
file depends on the file type a signature is taken from, see Section 4.2.2. The test begins by
scanning the oldest date directory we have, then we add the signatures of that date to the
database and scan it again. Then we scan the next date directory before and after adding
that date’s signatures, and so on. For the signature-basis experiment, we tested to see the
effect of adding single signatures rather than the signatures for the whole day. For this
experiment, ClamAV is asked to scan the 10 files, which consist of a signature’s extracted
characters, before and after adding that signature to the database.
Question #2: If the first question is confirmed, is it possible to exploit the timing
channel in a real attack? Figure 4.4 illustrates a real-world scenario. A victim, who
has ClamWin antivirus and Clam Sentinel installed, connects, through Internet Explorer,
to a web server which is controlled by the attacker. Once connected, the victim is asked to
download an ActiveX component that looks necessary to accomplish a certain task. Once
downloaded, the ActiveX is started by JavaScript code. Then the ActiveX component
creates a file that will be scanned by the antivirus and measures the CPU usage for a
certain amount of time to determine the busy period the CPU experienced. We used the
PDH (Performance Data Helper) library to query the processor time performance counter.
This experiment starts when the CPU is almost idle. To determine the busy period of the
CPU, we need a way to make sure that the CPU is busy with the antivirus rather than any
other process which might be woken up or started at some time and then compute for a
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small amount of time. So, the attacker can repeat the process to separate signal from noise
coming from the CPU running other processes. What distinguishes the antivirus scanning
process is that it keeps the CPU busy until it is done. This feature makes differentiating
the start and the end time of the busy period easier. We determine the busy period in two
stages: in the first stage, we start collecting all CPU usage samples (1 data point every
15 milliseconds) for 35 seconds, which is more than enough for the antivirus to scan a
file, starting right after we close the file (the on-access scanner starts scanning right after
closing the file). In the second stage, we take the averages of every contiguous 10-datapoint sequence of the collected data from the first stage. We take the higher-than-normal
averages (a threshold is set empirically) as start and end points and compute the elapsed
scanning time based on this difference. After getting the total time the antivirus spent
scanning the file, the ActiveX component triggers an event that will be received by a
JavaScript function which, in turn, will send the results to the remote attacker.
A simpler model could be an insider threat which does not need a connection to a
remote server.

Figure 4.3: Test file hierarchy per date D. The higher level directory D contains the
files created for all signatures which were released on that day. Each V directory
contains files created for only one signature.
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Figure 4.4: A scenario for a real-world attack. The client uses Internet Explorer to
connect to the server. Then, the client is asked to download an ActiveX component
which a JavaScript script can control. The component creates a file and returns the
CPU busy period, which will be considered as the scanning time, to the JavaScript as
an event. The JavaScript sends the result back to the server.

4.4

Results

In this section, we present results to answer the two questions we asked in Section 4.3. The
results show that an attacker can exploit a timing channel from newly added signatures
and that this attack can be implemented in a real-world scenario. We ran the first two
experiments in Linux 2.6, on an Intel Core 2 Quad CPU at 2.66 GHz, and 8 GB RAM.
Also, we ran the ActiveX experiments in Windows 7 OS, on an Intel Dual Core Atom
CPU at 1.66 GHz, with 4 GB RAM.

4.4.1

Day-by-day experiment

In this experiment, we scanned a number of files that were created for each day, before
and after adding the signatures of the day. See Section 4.3 for more details about the
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setup. The clamscan command line program was used to initiate the scan. The averages
were taken over 10 runs for each day. We take the differences between the scanning time
averages after and before adding signatures (i.e., the time to scan files after adding the
signatures minus the time to scan files before adding the signatures).
Figure 4.5 shows a histogram of the differences represented by the ranges. For an xaxis value v, the corresponding y-axis value w is the number of occurrences that are in this
range: (v − 0.025: v]. As expected, there are only 10 instances where the scanning times

before and after adding signatures are almost the same. For all other instances, adding new
signatures creates timing differences.

4.4.2

Single signatures experiment

In this experiment, we scan a number of files that are created to exploit only one signature
each time. The clamscan command line program was used to initiate the scan. The
averages were taken over 4 runs for each experiment. We take the differences between the
scanning time averages after and before adding a signature. Figure 4.6 shows that a timing
channel for one signature can be determined with high probability. For an x-axis value
v, the corresponding y-axis value is the number of occurrences that are in this range: (v 0.025: v].

4.4.3

ActiveX experiment for GENERIC type files

In this experiment, the ActiveX component creates 5 MB files and measures the time that
the antivirus (ClamWin and Clam Centinal) spends on the CPU while scanning the files.
Each run represents the creation and measurement time for only one file. This file is created by concatenating a randomly generated benign sequence of characters (i.e., sequence
of characters which has no effect in how a signature is inserted into Aho-Corasick tries or
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Boyer-Moore linked lists) or by concatenating a randomly chosen extracted sequence of
characters (i.e., sequence of characters which affects the shape of the Aho-Corasick tries
or Boyer-Moore linked lists). The files considered are of type GENERIC. Each run is
repeated 5 times to ensure that the results are consistent. Figure 4.7 presents the averages
over 5 runs for each file for both benign and extracted cases. Figure 4.8 zooms out on
the area where both get closer. The results show that the scanning time for the extracted
characters are always higher than that of the benign characters except for one data point
(data point 2 in the case of extracted and 9 in case of benign), where both are equal.
In Figure 4.9, we present the worst case scenario where we compare the minimum
runs in the case of the extracted characters to the maximum runs in the case of benign
files. The results still show that the scanning time for the extracted characters are always
higher than that of the benign ones except for two data points (data points 2 and 3 in the
case of extracted and 9 in the case of benign). Figure 4.10 zooms out on the area where
both get closer.

4.4.4

ActiveX experiment for HTML type files

In this experiment, instead of starting by filling characters into an empty file, we append
characters to a basic HTML file. This would make the numbers different from the above
experiment because the scanning engine will be directed to scan the files against signatures
in the HTML (rather than GENERIC) root, see Section 4.2.2 for more information. Figure 4.11 shows the averages over 5 runs for each created file while Figure 4.12 represents
the worst case scenario where we compare the minimum runs in the case of the extracted
characters to the maximum runs in the case of the benign files.
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Figure 4.5: Scanning time differences before and after adding signatures of a day.

Figure 4.6: Scanning time differences before and after adding a single signature.

4.5

Discussion and future work

We argue that stealthily scanning clients is powerful because, besides being stealthy, it
allows the attacker to gain a higher level of information. The notion of scanning clients,
rather than servers, is a more fitting threat model for today’s exploits that are based on
“drive-by downloads.” The user makes the initial connection and thus gives the attacker
an opportunity to scan their machine. Web browsers are well known to be one of the main
avenues for modern attack.
The running example of checking, through a timing channel, how up-to-date ClamAV
is shows that application-level reconnaissance attacks are practical and can reveal highlevel information about a user’s system. The same general approach could be used to
detect which antivirus program is installed (if any), the presence of other security software
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Figure 4.7: Scanning time of creating GENERIC type files out of benign and extracted
characters. Each data point represents an average over 5 runs

Figure 4.8: The same experiment as in Figure 4.7 with clear border between benign
and extracted.

such as local intrusion detection systems or personal firewalls, if other malicious code is
installed that hooks into some system behavior, mouse activity, the patch-level of the operating system, and more. Because all of these can be determined through timing channels,
the attacker has a high degree of flexibility in the APIs used for scanning and need not
have control of the system before doing reconnaissance.
Although our prototype attack, which was built for testing purposes to determine the
time scales involved, is based on ActiveX the only three capabilities needed for a real
application-level reconnaissance attack are to create or modify a file, measure the CPU
usage, and keep track of time. Creating or modifying a file is possible even without APIs,
simply by causing a file to be cached or a string of data to be logged. Furthermore, modern
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Figure 4.9: The same experiment as in Figure 4.7, but we show the worst case scenario.

Figure 4.10: The same experiment as in Figure 4.9, but we show the worst case scenario with clear border between benign and extracted.

antivirus programs scan much more than just files and hook into a browser in many more
places, so the surface available to scan them is larger than that of ClamAV. Measuring
CPU usage can often be accomplished with several different APIs, or the attacker can
simply measure the progress of one or more threads, which can be low priority need not
necessarily consume all cores of the CPU if their timing for giving up the CPU is carefully
orchestrated. Finally, keeping track of time is possible with a large variety of APIs, and
need not be done on the client being scanned since the attacker’s server can simply view
events from the client and measure time itself. Crosby et al. [37] demonstrate that timing
attacks can be performed over the internet with an accuracy of 15-100 microseconds, so in
some cases it is not even necessary to use the clients timekeeping API.
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Figure 4.11: Scanning time of creating HTML type files out of benign and extracted
characters. Each data point represents an average over 5 runs.

Figure 4.12: The same experiment as in Figure 4.11, but we show the worst case
scenario.

We chose ClamAV for our tests because it is open source, the details of its core scanning algorithms are documented on the web, and the developer community for ClamAV is
very helpful. We believe that more advanced antivirus programs, such as the proprietary
antivirus programs that perform advanced filtering, emulation, algorithmic scanning, and
heuristics, offer a lot more information that can be inferred from timing attacks than ClamAV. Table 4.1 shows how timing channel attacks could be possible in modern antivirus
software. In general, the more sophisticated an antivirus program is, the more tradeoffs
between performance and the number of patterns that can be detected must be traded off
by amortizing fast codes paths vs. slow code paths. So, even though a closed-source,
proprietary antivirus program would take a significant amount of more effort to develop

82

Chapter 4. Antivirus Security: Timing Channel Attacks Against Antivirus Software
timing attacks for, the opportunities for gaining detailed high-level information about, for
example, how up-to-date the signature database is will be much greater.
In terms of mitigation strategies to help ameliorate the type of high-level reconnaissance attacks we present in this chapter, strategies are needed that still allow for performance tradeoffs to be made for common cases. Predictive black-box mitigation [15] is a
promising approach, and could potentially be applied by the antivirus program to maintain
good performance while also minimizing the impact of timing channels attacks.

4.6

Related work

4.6.1

Network discovery

Network reconnaissance is very important first step in launching an attack. vPort scanning
is a well known technique to probe networks and discover information about remote systems and the services they run. The threat model in port scanning is that the attacker, as
a client, initiates the scanning victims who are servers that are reachable on the network.
Nmap [64] is a well known tool to discover open, closed, and filtered ports, operating systems, services, and version information. All information that Nmap can get, however, is
limited because it can only use raw packets and exposed services to discover information
about networked hosts. Also, stateful and well configured firewalls and intrusion detection systems can stop many port scanning techniques. In our approach, the threat model
is different. The attacker, who acts a server, waits for connections from victims, who are
clients. Once connected, the attacker seeks to learn about the victim from the application
layer, where a richer amount of information is available.
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4.6.2

Timing channel attacks

Timing channel attacks are based on measuring the time it takes for a program to perform a task [17, 59, 100]. Timing channels have been exploited to reveal the secret keys
in cryptographic systems [19, 84, 23], reveal SSH user passwords [90], breach users privacy [42], or detect virtual machines [47]. In this chapter, we exploited a timing channel
attack in ClamAV antivirus by noticing the affect of adding a signature to the database on
the scanning engine algorithm.
The work closest to our own is Bortz et al. [20]. Using timing attacks on web applications, they were able to find out private information about a user’s web activity, such as
the status and result of logins and login attempts, the number of objects on a page, and so
forth. Our work extends timing attacks through the browser beyond web applications and
shows that it is possible to find out security-relevant information about a potential victim
machine’s configuration.

4.6.3

Antivirus research

Attacking antivirus software is possible because antivirus is just software that could have
vulnerabilities [1]. Because antivirus programs match data against a signature database,
evading detection is possible using obfuscation transformations [29]. New signatures for
obfuscated versions of viruses are generated based on samples of the newly obfuscated
versions of that virus that are found in the wild. By measuring how up-to-date a potential
victim’s antivirus signature database is before attacking, an attacker can use older versions
of their malicious code when possible and greatly reduce the exposure of their newest
malicious codes.
Christodorescu et al. [30] shows that it is possible to extract the signature for a specific
virus that the antivirus is using to detect that virus.
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4.7

Conclusion

We showed that application-level reconnaissance through timing channels has the potential to reveal detailed, high-level information about a system to an attacker. The running
example we used for the experimental results given in this chapter was based on checking
how up-to-date the ClamAV antivirus on a given machine is. The results show that the
attacker, with high accuracy, can determine if the database has been updated with certain
signatures or not. Although most research concentrates on the potential of clients scanning servers, we concentrated in this chapter on the possibility of scans that a server might
perform on a client. Also, the scans we considered occur at the application layer and can
reveal much more information than, for example, port scanning. We believe that this type
of reconnaissance will become increasingly important to study in the near future.
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Technique
Algorithmic
Scanning

Code
tion

Description
Essential part
of modern AV
architecture.
Implemented
as java-like pcode (portable
code) using a
virtual machine

Fast Scanning
The input file
does not trigger
the algorithmic
scanning

Emula- Powerful technique that emulates the execution through the
CPU and the
memory

The input file
has no kind of
encryption or
suspicious patterns to trigger
the emulation

Heuristics

Slow Scanning
The file triggers
the algorithmic
scanning
to
run
portable
code (p-code)
and its virtual
machine which
is hundreds of
times slower
than
native
machine code
Certain
encrypted
files
can trigger the
emulation

The structures Programs’
Inconsistency
of
programs shapes
look between meta
could trigger normal
data and acheuristics detual data in
tection if they
programs, or
look suspicious
abnormality in
the organization of program
sections

Example
When
triggered,
the
algorithm
to
detect
Zmist
virus
needs
to execute at
least 2 million
p-code-based
iterations [92]
Fabi.9608 encrypted virus
puts itself at
the entry point
of PE infected
files. Although
emulating the
entry point of
the infected file
would expose
the virus, it will
significantly
slow
things
down [92]
Heuristic
scanning
is
triggered when
a PE program
has an entry
point pointing
not to any of
the
sections
but to an area
after the header
and before raw
data (CIH-style
viruses) [92]

Table 4.1: Modern antivirus techniques still make timing channels possible.
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Chapter 5
Antivirus Usability: Antivirus
Performance Characterization
It is well accepted that basic protection against common cyber threats is important, so it
is recommended to have antivirus (AV) software installed on modern personal computers.
However, what price do users pay in terms of performance, battery life, and other usability factors? Most effective AV products are commercial and thus for proprietary reasons
the way that they work and how they affect the whole system is not openly published.
Because it is important for security researchers and system developers to understand how
exactly the AV impacts the whole system, in this work we take the approach of tracing
operating system events. The AV adds layers of overhead and interfaces over systems
that already have many complicated layers such as Microsoft Windows. Because there is
very little open information in the literature to provide an understanding of how the AV’s
functionality impacts performance, our goal in this work is to shed some light on this.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to present an OS-aware approach to
analyse and reason about AV performance impact. Our results show that the main reason
for performance degradation in the tasks we tested with AV software is that they mainly
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spend the extra time waiting on events. Sometimes AV does cause some CPU overhead,
but events such as hard page faults (i.e., those that require disk accesses) are the main
contributing factor to AV overhead. Because of the AV’s intrusive behavior, the tasks in
our experiments are caused to create more file I/O operations, page faults, system calls,
and threads than they normally do without AV installed.

5.1

Introduction

Antivirus (AV) software, though vulnerable to many new attacks and unknown threats, is
still widely used and recommended because it can detect a wide range of known malware
threats. AV can also detect some unknown malware through heuristic algorithms [41] that
it runs looking for malware-similar behaviors. According to two studies [4, 54], 80-81%
of end-users have AV software installed on their computers. Also, Microsoft Windows
alerts users who do not have AV installed and encourages them to install some form of AV.
Most AVs are commercial and their scanning algorithms are not revealed to the public. Even though this strategy is good for the AV venders to compete, it is not good for
security researchers who will not be able to assess the AV’s effects on the system. There is
no effort in the security research literature that specifically targets analyzing commercial
AV software. Understanding the ways that AV adds operating system events and layers
of interfaces on top of existing systems is important not just for performance reasons, but
also because the extra events have reliability and security implications. The delays caused
by AV may exacerbate existing race conditions, for example. Also, viruses may use AV’s
performance overhead to fingerprint machines and gain information about what AV software is installed and how up-to-date it is [13]. Lastly, usability is a growing concern for
security tools, yet AV impacts on usability are not well understood.
AV performance impact has not been well studied. Some studies [94, 8, 5] have con-
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ducted experiments aiming to show the overhead (extra time or instructions) the AV adds
while performing specific tasks. These studies did well in identifying AV performance
overhead, but a major question still remains which is to know what exactly causes this
overhead. In this work we consider the AV as a property of the whole system, and we
use a system-wide inspection approach to characterize its performance based on different types of OS events. Although monitoring the system from the hardware-level [94] is
useful and the hardware performance counters can give cycle-accurate information, the
hardware view is limited in terms of information it can provide because of its low level
of abstraction. Our approach is to have a system-wide, OS-aware instrumentation scheme
that is able to provide information at different levels of abstraction.
In this work, we examine the performance issues caused by the AV from the OS point
of view. We utilized an instrumentation tool to inspect the whole system: a Windows builtin technology, called Event Tracing for Windows (ETW). This technology is integrated
with the Microsoft Windows kernel to log events of interest very efficiently, when enabled.
More details about this technology are in Section 5.2. We designed several experiments
that represent common end-user tasks with and without AV software installed to see how
intrusive the AV is to these tasks and thus to pinpoint its performance impact. For more
general results, we pursued two AVs: Symantec and Sophos.

5.2

Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)

Because the AV intercepts and inspects system-wide operations, we need a system-wide
tool to be able to understand the AV’s behavior. Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is a
low-overhead, system-wide instrumentation technology that comes with Microsoft Windows, starting from Windows 2000. ETW is integrated into the kernel so that it can capture
most kinds of OS events, including process-related, CPU-related, IO-related, and memoryrelated events. ETW can be enabled or disabled at any time without any need to restart
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<Correlation ActivityID=”{00000000 −0000 −0000 −0000 −000000000000}” />

<Execution ProcessID=”2120” ThreadID=”6592” ProcessorID=”0” KernelTime=”0” ←֓
UserTime=”15” />

<Channel />
<Computer />
</System>
<EventData>
<Data Name=”UniqueProcessKey”>0xFFFFFA800E071060</Data>
<Data Name=”ProcessId”>0x77C</Data>
<Data Name=”ParentId”>0x848</Data>
<Data Name=”SessionId”>

1</Data>

<Data Name=”ExitStatus”>259</Data>
<Data Name=”DirectoryTableBase”>0x14E594000</Data>
<Data Name=”UserSID”>\\alsaleh−hpdv6\alsaleh</Data>
<Data Name=”ImageFileName”>calc . exe</Data>
<Data Name=”CommandLine”>&quot ; C : \ Windows\system32\calc . exe&quot ; </Data>
</EventData>
<RenderingInfo Culture=”en−US”>
<Opcode>Start</Opcode>
<Provider>MSNT_SystemTrace</Provider>
<EventName xmlns=”http : / / schemas . microsoft . com / win / 2 0 0 4 / 0 8 / events / t r a c e ”>←֓
Process</EventName>
</RenderingInfo>
<ExtendedTracingInfo xmlns=”http : / / schemas . microsoft . com / win / 2 0 0 4 / 0 8 / events / t r a c e ”>
<EventGuid>{3d6fa8d0−fe05−11d0−9dda−00c04fd7ba7c}</EventGuid>
</ExtendedTracingInfo>
</Event>

Listing 1
The ETW architecture consists of four components: controllers, providers, sessions,
and consumers. See Figure 5.1.

1. Controller : the controller’s main job is to start/stop tracing.
2. Provider : a provider is a source of events. Whenever an event happens, it sends it
out to one of the sessions.
3. Session : sessions manage buffers and log events into trace files.
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7 images. All partitions have the same exact software except that the second partition has
Sophos AV installed and the third partition has Symantec AV installed. Besides Windows
7, each partition has Microsoft Office 2010, Windows SDK 7.1 (which contains Windows
Performance Tools 4.7), and Python. The Windows update service and the indexing services were disabled to prevent accidental events from taking place in the middle of the
experiments. Also, we disabled the caching property of Symantec and purged Sophos’
cache after each run to make sure that they are running from the same state in each experiment. We ran each experiment 10 times and computed the mean and the standard
deviation to provide 95% confidence intervals. We compared the Vanilla case with the AV
by conducting t-tests. A t-test measures if the means of two distributions are significantly
different. The t-test score gives the probability of having observed the observed data if the
means were not different. The smaller the t-test score, the more significant the difference.
A p-score is 1 minus the t-test score, so a high p-score indicates a high confidence that
the observed data shows a significant difference. We used a one-tailed, unpaired t-test that
does not assume equal variances. All of the experiments in the following section were conducted on every partition separately and the machine was rebooted after every experiment
before starting a new experiment.

5.3.1

Experiments

1. Client-Server: a PowerShell script starts the ETW logging, and then starts a Python
client that connects to a server on another machine using sockets. The client then receives a compressed file from the server that is password-protected. The compressed
file has putty.exe, the popular SSH client. After receiving the file, putty.a, the script
uncompresses the file using 7za.exe, a decompression program. Once the decompression is done, the logging is disabled and the log file is taken. This experiment
involves file I/O operations, system calls, CPU operations, and networking.
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2. Write to Microsoft Word and save: a PowerShell script starts the ETW logging,
creates a new Microsoft Word COM object, writes a short sentence to the object,
saves and closes the object into a Word document call word.doc, and then stops
logging. In this experiment we want to see how the AV interacts with such common
operations that end-users frequently do. Memory and file I/O operations are involved
in this experiment.
3. Copy from Microsoft Word to Microsoft PowerPoint: a PowerShell script starts
the ETW logging, creates a new Microsoft Word COM object, opens a pre-created
Word file (wordsourcedoc.doc) into the new object, copies its contents into the clipboard (the contents are only a short sentence), creates a new Microsoft PowerPoint
COM object, creates a new presentation in the PowerPoint object, adds a new slide
to the created presentation, pastes the copied sentence into the slide, saves the PowerPoint object, closes both objects, and stops logging. This experiment shows a
frequent act in which end-users copy data from one application into another. The
question is how the AV interacts with this process that involves COM object creation
and data transfer between different applications.
4. YouTube: a PowerShell script starts the ETW logging and creates an Internet Explorer COM object and causes it to navigate to a particular video on www.youtube.com.
Then the script sleeps for five seconds, letting the browser start the video, and then it
closes the browser and stops logging. This experiment involves using a web browser,
Internet Explorer, which is considered one of main avenues of malware threats to
enter a system. Also, the experiment involves running the Adobe Flash plugin to
stream the video over the internet.
For each experiment, we want to collect a variety of OS events that happen during
the experiment. Afterwards, we want to see how the AV affects a task’s performance and
behavior by comparing the Vanilla and the AV cases and comparing the events. We want to
see if the AV causes performance overhead to tasks, and then, if such the overhead exists,
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Figure 5.8: Copy from Microsoft Word to Microsoft PowerPoint experiment: process
average return time (in sec) distributed between execute and ready states.

During its execution lifetime, a process is in one of three states: executing, waiting in
the ready queue to be scheduled on a CPU by the scheduler, or waiting for an event that,
when this event happens, puts the process back in the ready queue. Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.9,
and 5.10 show the time that processes spend in execute and ready states. It is apparent

Figure 5.9: Write to Microsoft Word experiment: process average return time (in sec)
distributed between execute and ready states.
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Figure 5.10: YouTube experiment: process average return time (in sec) distributed
between execute and ready states.

from figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 that the main reason for the overhead caused by the AV on
the running processes comes from waiting on events because the times spent on execute
and ready states for the Vanilla and AV cases are not different enough to explain AV
overhead. Figure 5.10 shows that in case of Symantec the main reason for the overhead

Figure 5.11: Client-Server experiment: the total number of processes, threads, and
images in the system before and during the experiment.
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Figure 5.12: YouTube experiment: the total number of processes, threads, and images
in the system before and during the experiment.

is the extra time that processes spend on using the CPU (see figure 5.4 for the overhead),
while in the Sophos case the overhead is distributed between CPU and waiting on events.
A process’ lifetime is affected by the system (hardware and software) it is running on.
Because we have fixed the hardware for all experiments, it is only the software that causes
variation in these experiments. Figure 5.11 shows the number of processes, threads, and
images that were created/loaded before and during running the Client-Server experiment.
The figure shows that the AV creates threads and loads images during the experiments
to achieve some scanning task. Figure 5.12 shows the same happening in the YouTube
experiment. Although this does not have a direct performance implication, it shows some
intrusiveness from the AV on the tasks. Also, those extra threads could compete with the
main tasks for some resources like the hard drive and memory.
All the t-test results for Figures 5.13 through 5.24 report more than 0.99 p-scores except for Figures 5.23 and 5.24 where the p-scores for Vanilla compared with Symantec are
0.73 and 0.90, respectively.
Figures 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 , and 5.16 show the numbers of file I/O operations on the files
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Figure 5.13: Client-Server experiment: the average of the total number of file I/O
operations with respect to the files involved in the experiment (python.exe, 7za.exe,
cmd.exe, client.py, putty.a, putty.exe).

involved in different experiments by whatever process, including the AV. The intrusiveness
of both AVs is also apparent in these figures.
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 show the total number of file I/O operations directly made by the

Figure 5.14: YouTube experiment: the average of the total number of file I/O operations with respect to the files involved in the experiment (iexplore.exe). A one-tailed
t-test for the difference between Vanilla and Sophos being at least 210 gives a p-score
of 0.95, meaning that we can be confident that Sophos is at least 210 larger than
Vanilla.
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Figure 5.15: Copy from Microsoft Word to Microsoft PowerPoint experiment: the
average of the total number of file I/O operations with respect to the files involved in
the experiment (winword.exe, powerpnt.exe, wordsourcedoc.doc, pres.ppt).

processes we considered. Symantec forces some processes to make file I/O operations that
they would not otherwise make. For example, python.exe performed 128 file I/O operations on a “ProgramData/Symantec/Definitions/VirusDefs/20110313.002/VIRSCAN7.DAT”

Figure 5.16: Write to Microsoft Word experiment: the average of the total number of
file I/O operations with respect to the files involved in the experiment (winword.exe,
word.doc).
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Figure 5.17: Client-Server experiment: the average of the total number of file I/O
operations invoked by the processes involved in the experiment. A one-tailed t-test
for the difference between Vanilla and Sophos being at least 145 gives a p-score of
0.95, meaning that we can be confident that Sophos is at least 146 larger than Vanilla.

Figure 5.18: YouTube experiment: the average of the total number of file I/O operations invoked by the processes involved in the experiment. A one-tailed t-test for the
difference between Vanilla and Sophos being at least 23500 gives a p-score of 0.95,
meaning that we can be confident that Sophos is at least 23500 larger than Vanilla.
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Figure 5.19: Client-Server experiment: the average of the total number of page faults
caused by the processes involved in the experiment.

file. The python.exe process does not read Symantec’s signatures during normal execution,
i.e., in the Vanilla case. Sophos, on the other hand, forces the processes to make file I/O
operations on “sophos detoured.dll, sophos∼1.dll”, and “swi lsp.dll” (Sophos Web Intelligence).

Figure 5.20: Write to Microsoft Word experiment: the average of the total number of
page faults caused by the processes involved in the experiment.

104

Chapter 5. Antivirus Usability: Antivirus Performance Characterization

Figure 5.21: Copy from Microsoft Word to Microsoft PowerPoint experiment: the
average of the total number of page faults caused by the processes involved in the
experiment.

Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21 show the number of caused page faults. When a process
causes a hard fault, it needs to wait until the page is read into memory from the hard
disk. The high increase of hard faults in both the Symantec and Sophos case experiments
explains the overhead they add to the processes’ lifetimes. Again, these faults are only

Figure 5.22: Client-Server experiment: the average of the total number of system
calls made by the processes involved in the experiment.
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Figure 5.23: YouTube experiment: the average of the total number of system calls
made by the processes involved in the experiment. A one-tailed t-test for the difference between Vanilla and Sophos being at least 108,000 gives a p-score of 0.95,
meaning that we can be confident that Sophos is at least 108,000 larger than Vanilla.

accumulated for the processes we considered.

Figure 5.24: Write to Microsoft Word experiment: the average of the total number of
system calls made by the processes involved in the experiment. A one-tailed t-test for
the difference between Vanilla and Sophos being at least 3670 gives a p-score of 0.95,
meaning that we can be confident that Sophos is at least 3670 larger than Vanilla.
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A system call proceeds from the user space (unprotected mode) to kernel space (protected mode) for the kernel to achieve a task on behalf of the user process and then reschedule the user process when the kernel’s task is done. Increasing the number of system calls
decreases performance. Figure 5.22 shows the increase in the number of system calls
made by the processes we care about in the cases of Symantec and Sophos, compared
with the Vanilla case. Figures 5.23 and 5.24 show the increase in system calls in the case
of Sophos, but in the case of Symantec the number of system calls is not significantly
different from that of Vanilla.

5.5

Discussion and future work

Although we claim that our approach is useful in characterizing the effect of AV programs
on running processes in terms of performance from the OS point of view, it is not perfectly
accurate. We depend on finding differences between the Vanilla and the AV cases to make
conclusions, which is not tightly coupled what the AV is actually doing. Some operations
might happen or not happen based on the system state or the state of the task that is about
to execute. For example, if an AV uses the same DLLs the task will be using, then the task
would not cause a hard fault in case of the AV because the AV might have already caused
the DLLs to have been brought in from the disk before the task starts. Also, a program
could perform some operations based on its last run or configuration, which might make
its execution performance profile look different. To deal with this problem, we repeated
each experiment 10 times and computed the mean and 95% confidence interval for them.
In this work, we started from the files and processes we needed to consider because
they were related to the task being tested, to find out what operations they perform or are
performed on them. Another approach, which is a possible future work, is to start from
the AV components and directly find out what exactly they are doing through a reverseengineering process. This approach is challenging, though, because we would need to
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know all of the changes and the components the AV adds to the system when it is installed.

5.6

Related work

The AV software is well known in the literature to prevent viruses and worms from spreading, including known threats and, through heuristics, some unknown threats. Surfing the
internet without having an AV program installed is not considered safe. Although pattern
matching is at the heart of every AV scanning engine, other techniques such as heuristics [41], code emulation, and algorithmic scanning are essential parts of modern AVs [92].
Little research has been conducted towards analyzing and improving AVs, mainly because most AVs are closed source. A few papers [61, 67, 77, 96, 7, 87, 49] have focused on
improving the AV scanning time. Lin et al. [61] proposed a hybrid algorithm to enhance
the scanning engine of ClamAV [2]. Miretskiy et al. [67] designed an on-access AV file
system that accumulatively scans files under operations in ClamAV. Paul et al. [77] aimed
at improving and speeding up the AV scanning engine by utilizing the disk drive processor. Vasiliadis et al. [96] also provided a parallel AV scanning engine by utilizing modern
graphics processors (GPUs). Several other works [7, 87, 49] suggest using a specialized
hardware for virus scanning. What is common to all of these previous works is that they
try to enhance the AV scanning time by some means. In our work, we focus instead on
exposing the direct effects of the AV on tasks from the OS point of view.
Al-Saleh et al. [13] shows that it is possible to create timing channel attacks against
AVs that can reveal the presence of AV and how up-to-date the AV’s’ signature database
is, even to the granularity of individual signatures, by sending carefully crafted strings
of bytes to a remote machine that do not trigger AV but cause differences in response
times. Christodorescu et al. [30] shows that it is possible to extract the signature for a
specific virus that the AV is using to detect that virus. The closest to our work is Ulusji
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et al. [94], however they studied the performance of the AV purely at the hardware level
while our approach is to characterize the AV performance from the OS point of view.
More limited ways of measuring AV performance [8, 5] are conducted by running a task
and then comparing the total time while running different AVs, our study seeks to provide
more details by explaining how the extra time is spent in terms of OS events such as page
faults and system calls.
Software instrumentation [56, 22, 71, 25, 88] is a powerful technique to analyze programs’ behaviors through adding extra code at certain positions of the instrumented programs. The purpose of instrumentation could be measuring performance, proving correctness, or assuring the security of programs. Pin [56] is a dynamic binary instrumentation tool that can instrument binaries at the instruction level without modifying them.
DTrace [25] is a whole-system instrumentation tool for UNIX-based systems such as Solaris and Linux. ETW is similar to DTrace, but ETW is integrated within the Microsoft
Windows kernel.

5.7

Conclusion

Less care has been given by the research community to study the functionality and performance impact of AV software despite how important and widely used it is. In this work,
we investigated the performance issues for two commercial AVs: Symantec and Sophos.
While previous techniques to studying AV concentrated on the elapsed times of running
tasks with the existence of AVs or viewed the problem from a purely hardware point of
view, we focused on an OS-aware approach to give more meaningful and accurate results
that include the reasons for increased return times for tasks. We used the Event Tracing
for Windows instrumentation technology (a system-wide, kernel-integrated tool), xperf (a
performance tool), and PowerShell (an automation and scripting framework in Windows)
to design our experiments so that the performance overhead experienced by real users
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was represented in our experiments. Our experiments were designed to simulate common
end-user tasks. Our results show that a considerable amount of performance overhead is
added by the AVs because of the AV program’s intrusiveness. The main impact of the
AV on tasks is that they spend extra time waiting on events. The AV changes a task’s
behavior by forcing it do more file I/O operations and system calls, causing more page
faults, and creating more threads. We also showed that a process’ behavior is changed
with the existence of an AV program. So, for software development processes (design,
testing, debugging), intrusion detection systems (which might look at a process changing
its behavior as anomalous), and other system-wide performance and behavior-based security issues, the AV is an important factor that should be taken into consideration in future
efforts to design secure systems.
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Conclusion
Although the trade-off between usability and security is well known, efforts to understand
these trade-offs and improve them should be continuous to achieve a better balance. Not
only are security tools supposed to secure systems against attacks, but also they are required to not degrade the usability of systems by, for example, degrading the performance
or providing very restricted environments which systems’ users can not use effectively.
Towards achieving better security and usability, in this dissertation we examined the internals of modern security tools and reasoned about security and usability problems which
previous research had not identified because of limited experiments and controlled environments. This dissertation studies two modern security tools, Dynamic Information Flow
Tracking (DIFT) and Antivirus (AV) software, for their importance and wide usage.
Even though applying all propagation rules in a DIFT system is admittedly important, some of those rules are dropped from current systems for usability (stability) reasons.
Because we implemented and experimented with DIFT systems that applied all rules, we
were able to identify the contributing factors to the DIFT overtagging problem and provide
a practical approach to deal with it in two ways. First, to show that systems complication
(software and hardware) contributes to the overtagging problem in DIFT, we successfully
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applied DIFT to sensor network devices. DIFT for sensor network devices provides a
secure and usable system that accommodates the special requirements of a sensor network device. Second, in our DIFT implementation for general purpose computers as an
intrusion detection system, tags are the mutual information between sources and destinations. We also introduced the notion of lifetime usage for tags as a main strategy to deal
with overtagging. Our work suggests that accounting for data sources and having contextaware tagging to avoid overtagging are important to achieve accurate dynamic information
flow in any future work.
The second security tool this dissertation is interested in is the Antivirus (AV) software
because it has received less attention from tje research community, despite its importance
and wide usage. Besides the possibility of being evaded by new attacks that threaten AV
security, the AV should be aware of timing channel attacks that the attacker could use to
learn details about the AV and its signature database based on the time the AV spends
on scanning carefully crafted inputs. By studying the ClamAV internals, we were able
to launch a timing channel attack against it to infer how up to date ClamAV is, based on
the scanning time. We also show that commercial AVs are susceptible to the same kinds
of attacks. The possibility for the attacker to remotely fingerprint a client AV is a future
work.
We also studied the AV performance impact and intrusiveness on systems, because
these are main factors towards the AV usability. The AV installs system-wide hooks to
inspect system operations. To study the AV effects on a system, we need to have a systemwide instrumentation tool that is able to account for all kinds of OS events. Event Tracing
for Window (ETW) is such an instrumentation tool that does exactly that. By dumping the
ETW data into PostgreSQL, we were able to aggregate information about what happens
with and without the existence of the AV, and make comparisons. We showed that the
AV affects tasks by causing them to spend more time waiting on events or using the CPU.
The AV needs to be less intrusive to tasks for it to be completely acceptable and thus
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usable by users, especially in constrained environments such as laptops. We expect this
research to establish a foothold towards analyzing the AV software in detail rather than
dealing with it as an unknown within a system. As a future research, we intend to study
the AV performance impact by tracking the changes and the components the AV adds to
the system when it is installed.
The thesis that this dissertation tested was the claim that we can reason about security
and usability trade-offs in fine-grained ways by building and testing full systems. We have
demonstrated this through testing various aspects of DIFT and AV.
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